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I. INTRODUCTION
Amid the dense forest and 120 villages that spread across the Rayagada and
Kalahandi districts of the Niyamgiri Hills in southwestern Odisha, India, reside
the 10,000 members of the Dongria Kondh. They are a small community of
horticultural mountain dwellers who hold sacred the mountain and its deity,
Niyam Raja (“the giver of law”).1 They inhabit a 250-square kilometer area
known for its unadulterated landscapes and pure streams.2 They are an ancient
people, and references to them appear in the Hindu myths and classics, notably
the Purānas (Sanskrit: पुराण).3 The Indian government regards them as one of
the country’s few Particularly Vulnerable Tribal Groups.4 They refer to
themselves as Jharma, the protectors of the stream.5

*Christopher Rossi teaches international law at the University of Iowa Law College.
1 Kundan Kumar, The Sacred Mountain: Confronting Global Capital at Niyamgiri, 54 GEOFORUM 196,
196 (2014).
2 MEENAL TATPATI ET AL., THE NIYAMGIRI STORY: CHALLENGING THE IDEA OF GROWTH WITHOUT
LIMITS? 5 (2016).
3 Sanjeeta Kumari Devi, Socio-Economic Status of the Dongria Kondhs: A Primitive Tribal Group of
Niyamgiri Hillis in Eastern Ghats of Orissa, 2 INT’L J. RSCH. 60, 63 (2016).
4 Gandham Bulliyya, Ethnographic and Health Profile of the Dongria Kondh: A Primitive Tribal Group
of Niyamgiri Hills in Eastern Ghats of Orissa, 1 AFRO ASIAN J. ANTHROPOLOGY & SOC. POL’Y 11,
15 (2010). India has over 700 official (“scheduled”) tribes and the largest number (sixty-two) inhabit
Odisha (formerly Orissa). National Commission for Scheduled Tribes, GOVERNMENT OF INDIA,
https://ncst.gov.in/content/frequently-asked-questions. In addition to the Dongria Kondh, Orissa has
twelve other Particularly Vulnerable Tribal Groups (formerly called Primitive Tribal Groups), the
highest number in India. See Other Information Relating to Tribals: Name of Particularly Vulnerable
Tribal Groups (PTGS) (Earlier Called as Primitive Tribal Groups, https://ncst.gov.in/content/otherinformation-relating-tribals (last visited Dec. 9, 2020).
5 See Anurag Mallick & Priya Ganapathy, The Tribes of Odisha, OUTLOOK TRAVELLER (Nov. 7, 2017),
https://www.outlookindia.com/traveller/ot-getaway-guides/the-tribes-of-odisha/ (noting their name is
derived from “dongar,” meaning “mountain;” however, they refer to themselves as Jharnia, meaning
“protectors of the stream.”).
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In 2003, a legal controversy arose when the London-based conglomerate
Vedanta Aluminum Limited signed a Memorandum of Understanding with
Odisha officials to construct an alumina refinery at the mountain’s base.6 The
plan included an open-pit, three million ton per annum, bauxite mining operation
atop the sacred mountain and a seventy-five megawatt coal-based power plant
to smelt the ore.7 India is one of the world’s leading bauxite producers, and the
state of Odisha is India’s leading producer of this ore.8 Bauxite is the principal
ore of aluminum and is one of the world’s most important non-ferrous metals.9
It is intensively used throughout modern industry.10
On April 18, 2013, the Supreme Court of India rendered judgment in a
contentious land use case, which has obvious environmental and human rights
implications.11 A lower court concluded that the construction work undertaken
by the petitioner began “without obtaining environmental clearance,” violating
environment impact assessment notification provisions of India’s Environment
(Protection) Act.12 The Supreme Court affirmed the finding13 and prevented the
corporation from mining bauxite.14 Its judgment also focused on the rights of
indigenous peoples (“Scheduled Tribes”) and “Traditional Forest Dwellers.”
Reviewing constitutional definitions of such peoples,15 the Court recognized
their “very old” and “well defined” status,16 agrarian livelihood,17 and “great
emotional attachments to their lands.”18 The Court observed that “[l]and is their
most important natural and valuable asset and imperishable endowment from
which the tribal derive their sustenance, social status, economic and social
equality, permanent place of abode, work and living.”19 The Court held that the
relevant statute in question, India’s Forest Rights Act (2006), did not merely
pertain to property rights or areas of habitation; it widened to include social
welfare provisions that protected the customary rights of forest dwellers “to use
forest land as a community forest resource.”20

6 Anjali George, Claiming Niyamgiri: The Dongria Kondh’s Struggle Against Vedanta, RITIMO (Dec. 18,
2014), https://www.ritimo.org/Claiming-Niyamgiri-the-Dongria-Kondh-s-Struggle-against-Vedanta.
7 Id. (recounting the tribe’s dispute with the mining company).
8Bauxite, INDIAN MINERALS YEARBOOK 2017 3-2, 3-10 (56th ed. 2018),
https://ibm.gov.in/writereaddata/files/06262018131044Bauxite(AR)2017.pdf. For general information,
see National Commission for Scheduled Tribes, GOVERNMENT OF INDIA, https://ncst.nic.in/.
9 Hobart M. King, Bauxite, GEOLOGY.COM (2020), https://geology.com/minerals/bauxite.shtml
(discussing bauxite, its composition and properties, and industrial uses).
10 Id.
11 Orissa Mining Corp. Ltd. v. Ministry of Env’t & Forest & Others, (2013) W.P.(C) No. 180/2011
(India), available at https://indiankanoon.org/doc/153831190/ [hereinafter Orissa Mining]. For a report
on the environmental impact of the mining operation produced by India’s Central Empowered
committee, which reports to the Indian Supreme Court to monitor regulations on hazardous waste and
complaints about environmental waste, see CENTRAL EMPOWERED COMMITTEE, REPORT IN IA NO.
1324 REGARDING THE ALUMINA REFINERY PLANT BEING SET UP BY M/S VENDANTA ALUMINA
LIMITED AT LANJIGARH IN KALAHANDI DISTRICT, ORISSA, (Sept. 21, 2005),
http://www.indiaresource.org/issues/globalization/2005/CECSep2005cancellicense.html.
12 See Orissa Mining, supra note 11, at ¶¶ 2, 11, 43.
13 Id. at ¶ 30.
14 Id.
15 Id. at ¶ 31 (discussing arts. 366(25) and 342 of the Indian Constitution).
16 Id. ¶ 49 (iii) (d).
17 Id. ¶ 33.
18 See Orissa Mining, supra note 11, at ¶ 33
19 Id.
20 Id. ¶ 43.
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The Court remanded the case to the State of Orissa to place the bauxite
mining project before the Gram Sabhas,21 or surrounding village assemblies, to
determine if the project, “in any way, affects their religious [and cultural] rights
. . . in the hills top of the Niyamgiri range.”22 Within three months, all 12 Gram
Sabhas had voted against the mining project, foreclosing Vedanta’s bauxite
mining plans atop Niyamgiri Mountain, sparking David and Goliath
comparisons23 and vindicating the Dongria Kondh in their decade-long dispute
with global capitalism.
Their cause attracted world-wide attention and support.24 Amnesty
International hailed the decision as a “landmark victory” recognizing indigenous
rights in India.25 Norway’s trillion-dollar Government Pension Fund26 excluded
Vedanta as an investment option “due to unacceptable risk of complicity”
involving “environmental damage and systemic human rights violations.”27 The
Church of England divested holdings in the company following complaints to
the British government under the Organization of Economic Co-operation and
Development guidelines for multinational companies.28
The international and comparative legal implications of this dispute may be
hard to extrapolate from Indian constitutional law, which embraces a variant of
federalism that is based on asymmetric relationships.29 The dynamics of India’s

21 See id. ¶¶ 58–63.
22 Id. ¶ 58. For reference to consideration of cultural claims, see id. ¶ 59.
23 Sophie Boehm & Carole Excell, The Man Who Stopped the Mine. Q&A with Prafulla Samantara,
2017 Goldman Environmental Prize Winner, WORLD RESOURCES INSTITUTE (Apr. 24, 2017),
https://www.wri.org/blog/2017/04/man-who-stopped-mine-qa-prafulla-samantara-2017-goldmanenvironmental-prize-winner (referencing the comparison to the battle between David and Goliath).
24 See Samantha Balaton-Chrimes, Desiring the Other and Decolonizing Global Solidarity: Time with
and Space in the Anti-Vedanta Campaign, 10 HUMANITY J. 239, 239 (Aug. 3, 2019), (assessing Survival
Internationals’ worldwide campaign to support the Dongria Kondh struggle to prevent the
conglomerate from acquiring their sacred mountain); Kumar, supra note 1, at 202 (charting the key
actors, activists, and organizations aligned to assist the Niyamgiri struggle).
25 India: Landmark Supreme Court Ruling a Great Victory for Indigenous Rights, AMNESTY INT’L (Apr.
18, 2013), https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2013/04/india-landmark-supreme-court-rulinggreat-victory-indigenous-rights/.
26 NORGES BANK INVESTMENT MGMT., https://www.nbim.no/ (last visited Dec. 9, 2020). The fund was
established in 1969 to manage the wealth benefits of revenue generated by Norway’s oil and gas
resources and is currently valued at more than $1.12 trillion (10,000 billion kroner).
27 COUNCIL OF ETHICS, GOVERNMENT PENSION FUND-GLOBAL, RECOMMENDATION OF MAY 15, 2007
38–39
(2007),
https://www.banktrack.org/download/recommendations_on_vedanta/recommendation_vedanta.pdf.
28 See Jo Woodman, India’s Rejection of Vedanta’s Bauxite Mine is a Victory for Tribal Rights, THE
GUARDIAN
(Jan.
14,
2014),
https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/povertymatters/2014/jan/14/india-rejection-vedanta-mine-victory-tribal-rights (discussing the precedential
value and effects of the landmark decision).
29 In S.R. Bommai v. Union of India, (1994) 3 SCC (Jour) 1, ¶ 15, India’s Supreme Court recognized the
United States as a model for federal structure. However, Article 3 of India’s Constitution allowed for
asymmetries between the Union and its respective states due to circumstances substantially different
“from the federal set-up established in the [U.S.]” Id. at ¶ 16. “‘Asymmetric federalism’ is understood
to mean federalism based on unequal powers and relationships in political, administrative and fiscal
arrangements spheres between the units constituting [India’s] federation.” M. Govinda Rao & Nirvikar
Singh, Asymmetric Federalism in India 2–3 (U.C. Santa Cruz Int’l Econ., Working Paper No. 04-08,
2004). On the importance of asymmetric federalism as a tool for societal coherence in India, see Louise
Tillin, United in Diversity? Asymmetry in Indian Federalism, 31 J. FEDERALISM 45 (2006). India’s
sudden repeal of Art. 370 in August 2019 in the disputed region of Jammu and Kashmir has sparked a
keen constitutional debate. For general background on Jammu and Kashmir’s former special
(asymmetric) status, see Sonia Dasgupta, Article 370: An Example of Asymmetrical Federalism?, 11
NUALS L.J. 27 (2017).
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internal or domestic complexity, not international law itself, engineered this
decision. However, questions of transnational resource management, neoliberal
economics, globalization, human rights, and domestic and international social
mobilization dynamics—all questions involving international law—pervaded
the case and intersected with the proceedings.
While problems of transnational globalization focus much attention on the
emerging rights of indigenous peoples, this conversation also implicates
neoliberalism and its market-based influences on development economics,
extraction politics, and emerging economies.30 The incorporation of indigenous
protections may result in a dramatic restructuring of international law. The 2007
United Nations (UN) Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples indicates
this movement is underway.31 However, such restructuration has been described
as “explosive” given “the ever-expanding economic role of transnational
enterprises as part of the emergence of global capitalism.”32
James Anaya, the former UN Special Rapporteur on the Rights of
Indigenous Peoples, recognized “[t]he growing awareness of the actual or
potential negative impact of industry operations on the rights of indigenous
peoples.” However, he labeled “natural resource extraction and other
development projects on or near indigenous territories . . . [as] possibly the most
pervasive source of the challenges to the full exercise of their rights.”33
Embedded in these tensions is international law’s collision course with the
question of place.
This article recognizes the often-discussed neoliberal implications of
transglobalism. However, it focuses on the lesser considered place-based factor
that affects international law’s construction. The diminishment of human spatial
geography in the development of international law continues to weigh down the
expression of human and indigenous rights, overshadowed as it often is by
extraction politics.
The place-based rise of challenges to exploitative resource development
suggests an important, interactive turn in the sociological development of
international law, a turn increasingly associated with international law’s spatial
construction. The Dongria Kondh campaign represents an emblematic
grassroots resistance movement that stretches across the transnational resourceextraction map. As dramatic as the Dongria Kondh’s victory may have been, its
world-wide impact remains in question. Domestic and international legal
systems currently confront numerous conflicts involving extraction politics, land
use issues, and indigenous rights.34 Notable struggles include Kalinga and
30 See generally THE ROAD FROM MONT PÈLERIN: THE MAKING OF THE NEOLIBERAL THOUGHT
COLLECTIVE (Philip Mirowski & Dieter Plehwe eds., 2009) (presenting essays on salon-styled
neoliberal outgrowth of the Mont Pèlerin Society and the voluntarist advantages of open society as
opposed to statist versions of interventionism).
31 See G.A. Res. 61/295, U.N. Doc. A/Res/61/295 (2007), https://undocs.org/A/RES/61/295
(recognizing, inter alia, “the urgent need to respect and promote the inherent rights of indigenous
peoples . . . especially their rights to their lands, territories and resources”).
32 Joshua Kleinfeld, The Double Life of International Law: Indigenous Peoples and Extractive
Industries, 129 HARV. L. REV. 1755, 1755 (2016).
33 James Anaya (Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples), Extractive Industries
Operating Within or Near Indigenous Territories, ¶ 55–56, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/18/35 (July 11, 2011).
34 Case Concerning Certain Phosphate Lands in Nauru (Nauru v. Aust.), 1992 I.C.J. REP. 240
(Preliminary Objections, Judgment) (concerning violations pertaining to the U.N Trusteeship system
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Bontok protests against the Chico River Basin Development Project in the
Philippines, Wet’suwet’en responses to the tar sands and gas pipelines project
in British Columbia, Guarani resistance to commercial plantations in Brazil,
Wajan and Jagalingou efforts to prevent coal mining in Australia,35 Mapuche
resistance to water diversion projects in Chile,36 Queche struggles against
mineral extraction in the Andean Cone,37 the confederated Native opposition to
the Dakota Access Pipeline across burial grounds of the Standing Rock Sioux
Nation,38 and the Inuit Circumpolar Council’s protest declaration against the
Ilulissat signatories’ self-professed stewardship of Arctic terrain and waters.39
These samplings of the domestic and transnational consequences of Native
movements highlight a growing awareness of indigenous rights as a prominent,
relatively recent resistance movement in international law,40 and the growing
normative and conventional legal emphasis on place-based peoples.41 These
samplings also evidence the continuing challenges to the idea of place, or what
the humanities describes as a sense of place.
This article investigates the persistence of this problem. It argues that
international law’s organization of nineteenth century space informs the

and principles of self-determination based on environmental damage claims brought by the Republic
of Nauru against Australian phosphate extraction). The parties later reached a settlement and
discontinued the proceedings. Certain Phosphate Lands in Nauru (Nauru v. Aust.), 1993 I.C.J. Rep.
322, 322–23 (Discontinuance Order of Sept. 13, 1993). For a discussion linking the Nauruan claim to
indigenous rights, see Antony Anghie, “The Heart of My Home”: Colonialism, Environmental
Damage, and the Nauru Case, 34 HARV. INT’L L.J. 445, 485–90 (1993).
35 See Tattpati, supra note 2, at 2.
36 See Diane Haughney, Defending Territory, Demanding Participation: Mapuche Struggles in Chile,
39 LAT. AM. PERSP. 201, 207–10 (2012) (discussing the indigenous people’s campaigns against
conglomerate hydroelectric projects).
37 See Helle Abelvik-Lawson, Indigenous Environmental Rights, Participation and Lithium Mining in
Argentina and Bolivia: A Socio-Legal Analysis 35 (May 2019) (Ph.D. dissertation, University of
Essex).
38 Amber Penn-Roco, Standing Rock and the Erosion of Tribal Rights, 73 NAT’L LAW. GUILD REV. 176,
176 (2016) (involving more than 100 tribes).
39 Art. 2 (2.6), A Circumpolar Inuit Declaration on Sovereignty in the Arctic, Apr. 2009, available at
https://iccalaska.org/wp-icc/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/Signed-Inuit-Sovereignty-Declaration11x17.pdf. (accusing the five coastal Arctic states—Norway, Denmark (Greenland), Canada, U.S., and
Russia—with negligence). See also Sophie Theriault, Northern Frontier, Northern Homeland: Inuit
People’s Food Security in the Age of Climate Change and Arctic Melting, 15 SW. J. INT’L L. 223, 243
n.90 and accompanying text (discussing the meeting in Nunavik leading up to the Declaration).
40 Alexandra Xanthaki, Indigenous Rights in International Law Over the Last 10 Years and Future
Developments, 10 MELB. J. INT’L L. 27, 27 (2009). On the acceleration of indigenous rights issues
beginning in the 1970s, see Adolfo de Oliveira, Introduction: Decolonising Approaches to Indigenous
Rights, in DECOLONISING INDIGENOUS RIGHTS 1, 3 (Adolfo de Oliveira ed. 2009); Peter Jull, The
Politics of Sustainable Development, in INDIGENOUS PEOPLES: RESOURCE MANAGEMENT & GLOBAL
RIGHTS 21, 25–7 (Svein Jentoft et al., eds. 2003) (discussing the rise of indigenous internationalism
beginning in 1973); Benedict Kingsbury, “Indigenous Peoples” in International Law: A
Constructivist Approach to the Asian Controversy, 92 AM. J. INT’L L. 414, 414 (1998) (noting the
transformative significance of “indigenous peoples” since the early 1970s); BRADLEY REED HOWARD,
INDIGENOUS PEOPLES AND THE STATE: THE STRUGGLE FOR NATIVE RIGHTS 95 (2003) (discussing the
early 1970s separation of the category of “indigenous populations” from that of “minorities”); Hurst
Hannum, New Development in Indigenous Rights, 28 VIRGINIA J. INT’L L. 649, 649–50 (1988)
(discussing more aggressive assertions of indigenous rights in the 1980s).
41 See U.N. Declaration on Rights of Indigenous Peoples, G.A. Res. 61/295, U.N. Doc. A/RES/61/295
(Sept. 13, 2007); International Labour Organization Convention (No. 169), Concerning Indigenous
and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries, June 28, 1989, 1650 U.N.T.S. 383, entered into force
Sept. 5, 1991 (revising ILO Convention 107 on Indigenous ad Tribal Populations); U.N. Doc.
A/Res/51/78 (Feb. 25, 1997) (deciding to include activities agenda establishing the International
Decade of the World’s Indigenous People).
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discussion. During this period, international law developed under the sway of
geographic emphases that conformed to a Eurocentric mindset of entitlement
and formalistic rulemaking. These emphases differed from the pragmatic
polycentric regional legal landscapes that preceded the rise of European
dominance,42 and even paradigmatic Augustinian notions of peace that extended
to the end of the eighteenth century.43
Colonialism catalyzed international law’s nineteenth and early twentieth
century universalization, which established a “right to rule” in conformity with
the unclear yet strongly asserted droit public de l’Europe and the ius publicum
europaeum.44 The effects of this historical encounter did not end with
decolonization, projecting instead its widening gyre to the formerly colonized
newborn republics.45 A “post-colonial paradox—guised as a “Greek Gift”—
arose in relation to hemispheric spatial organization with the acceptance of
formalistic law. The price paid by newborn republics for independence carried
with it the costs and schematics of a public international law that European
powers almost exclusively shaped as the makers of colonialism.46
This legacy continues to constrain international law and its interplay with
domestic legal systems. The highlands of the Niyamgiri Hills in India seem
remotely connected to the demise of metropolitan rule in the Americas, except
in consideration of the development of legal formalism, remnants of which
impede a fuller embrace of indigenous rights everywhere in international law.
This article contends that legal formalism helps to explain why the
incorporation of human geography and place-based considerations into
international law have been so difficult to achieve. Identifying legal formalism’s
key role, while avoiding its treatment as “a heresy driven underground” by the
“derogatory comments of its detractors,”47 clarifies difficulties affecting
developments in international law. The question of place and its relation to
international law extends beyond the ambit of indigenous rights. It pervades the
study and application of international law generally. Addressing this question
helps to explain international law’s dismissive encounter with the idea of
topophilia—the human sense (love) of place that undergirds much controversy
involving self-determination and indigenous rights.48 The argument here is that
legal formalism and its nineteenth century rise helped to construct the
imaginaries of America’s frontier expansion and its union with international
law’s “civilizing influence.”

42 Jörn Axel Kämmerer, Introduction. Imprints of Colonialism in Public International Law: On the
Paradoxes of Transition, 18 J. HIST. INT’L L. 239, 241–42 (2016).
43 See HARALD KLEINSCHMIDT, DISKRIMINIERUNG DURCH VERTRAG UND KRIEG:
ZWISCHENSTAATLICHE VERTRÄGE UND DER BEGRIFF DES KOLONIALKRIEGS IM 19. UND FRÜHEN 20.
JAHRHUNDERT 20 (2013).
44 Id. at 240.
45 See id. at 243–44 (discussing the formerly colonized shift toward discriminatory rule-making based
on the Euro-suppression of non-European trans-communitarian rule-making).
46 Id. at 240.
47 Ernest J. Weinrib, Legal Formalism: On the Immanent Rationality of Law, 97 YALE L.J. 949, 950
(1988).
48 Humanist geographer Yi-Fu Tuan popularized the term to complicate geography’s unwitting
orientation toward topography and physical locale. See generally YI-FU TUAN, TOPOPHILIA: A STUDY
OF ENVIRONMENTAL PERCEPTIONS, ATTITUDES, AND VALUES (1990); see also YI-FU TUAN, SPACE
AND PLACE: THE PERSPECTIVE OF EXPERIENCE (1977).
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Formalism in the United States is often presented as a post-Civil War
movement.49 While this article picks up on this theme, which resulted in a major
twentieth century confrontation with legal realism, it also traces formalism’s
antecedents to early nineteenth century judicial and political encounters with
slavery and Indian removal. The early American Republic’s ambivalent, if not
contradictory, treatment of these inherent problems helped to construct
formalism’s pathway into international law, which conceptualized an
international notion of place and space that emphasized sovereign rights and
dominium at the expense of indigenous rights.
Where did legal formalism come from and how did it cross over into
international law to diminish the significance of human geography and the rights
of indigenous peoples? Addressing these questions uncovers a significantly
American story.
Part II of this article traces the genealogy of formalism, highlighting its
development from teachings of German historicism and legal science. Although
subject to a variety of usages and definitions, formalism emphasized
immanence—the elaboration of legal principles from within the self-contained
domain of judicial reasoning. Part II also connects the rise of formalism to the
maturation of American common law, the professionalization of legal teaching
and practice, the doctrinal development of an American approach to
international law, and connections to parallel movements in European
international law in the latter part of the nineteenth century. Part III holds that
the difficulty with formalism’s judicial application in the United States began
much earlier in the nineteenth century than is commonly thought. Questions
relating to ending the international slave trade and Indian removal exposed
unreconcilable tensions with republican virtue while simultaneously shaping the
country’s ambivalent orientation to its internal and expanding frontier and its
widening encounter with international legal order. Part IV concludes this
discussion by suggesting that formalism’s incomplete treatment of spatiality and
place nevertheless crossed over into the corpus of modern international law and
continues to challenge the expression of indigenous rights and the spatial order
in this current age of neoliberalism and transglobal resource extraction. Under
such circumstances, the fuller expression of human rights and indigenous rights
are likely to be forestalled until international law completes its turn to address
questions of spatiality and place.
II. THE RISE OF FORMALISM
Formalism has been described as an unwieldy legal idiom with “so many
meanings and valences” as to make it an “all purpose” term of “approbation and

49 See NEIL DUXBURY, PATTERNS OF AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE 9 (1995).
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of disapprobation.”50 Although often defined by its critics,51 advocates also
agree that formalism emphasizes the rational deducibility of law.52 Its genealogy
generally traces to the development of mid-nineteenth century German legal
science, principally from Friedrich Carl von Savigny (1779-1861), Karl von
Gareis (1844-1923),53 and the German historical school.54 German historicism
attached meaning and context to the situatedness of law. Its adherents, called
Pandectists, drew inspiration from the Pandects of Justinian’s Digest, which
emphasized law’s self-contained completeness. They focused legal method on
the deducibility of an applicable legal principle from an examination of the
footprints internal to the development of place-based customs and practices,
which only the study of history could reveal.55 Its greatest English language
expositor, Sir Henry Maine (1822-1888), understood legal formalism to be a
progressive, depersonalized, and liberating evolutionary path that broke the
chains of established status relationships and forged new links to voluntary
contractual accords.56 This de-linking and re-forging process, in Weberian
terms, facilitated the projection of law as an instrument of logical formal
rationality—emphasizing proprietary ownership over interpersonal status
relationships, which had an overriding impact on Native and non-Native
connections to land and place.57
Max Weber’s (1864-1920) description of formalism captured its essential
elements:
first, that every concrete legal decision be the “application” of
an abstract legal proposition to a concrete “fact situation”;
second, that it must be possible in every concrete case to derive
the decision from abstract legal propositions by means of legal
logic; third, that the law must actually or virtually constitute a
“gapless” system of legal propositions, or must, at least, be
treated as if it were such a gapless system; fourth, that
whatever cannot be “construed” rationally in legal terms is also

50 Richard A. Posner, Legal Formalism, Legal Realism, and the Interpretation of Statutes and the
Constitution, 37 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 179, 180 (1986-1987). See also Philip Allott, Comments on
Jean D’Aspremont, Formalism and the Sources of International Law: A Theory of the Ascertainment
of Legal Rules, EJIL: TALK! (Dec. 12, 2012), https://www.ejiltalk.org/comments-on-jean-daspremontformalism-and-the-sources-of-international-law-a-theory-of-the-ascertainment-of-legal-rules/
(suggesting the word is so entangled in many different theoretical disputes that it might be better to
avoid its usage).
51 Paul N. Cox, An Interpretation and (Partial) Defense of Legal Formalism, 36 IND. L. REV. 57, 58
(2003).
52 Brian Leiter, Legal Formalism and Legal Realism: What is the Issue?, 16 LEGAL THEORY 11 (2010)
(noting formalism’s reliance on syllogistic reasoning, as well).
53 INSTITUTIONEN DES VÖLKERRECHTS (1888); KARL GAREIS, INTRODUCTION TO THE SCIENCE OF LAW:
SYSTEMATIC SURVEY OF THE LAW AND PRINCIPLES OF LEGAL STUDY (Albert Kocourek trans. 1911)
(1921).
54 F. VON SAVIGNY, POSSESSION (Perry Erskine trans., 6th ed. 1848). Hermann Kantorowicz identified
Savigny’s Über den Feruf unserer Zeit für Gesetzgebung und Rechtswissenschaft (1814) as the
“starting point” of the German historical school. Hermann Kantorowicz, Savigny and the Historical
School of Law, 53 L. Q. REV. 326, 332 (1937).
55 Yosef Lindell, A Science like any Other? Classical Legal Formalism in the Halakhic Jurisprudence
of Rabbis Isaac Jacob Reines and Moses Avigdor Amiel, 28 J. L. & RELIGION 179, 181 (2012).
56 Henry Sumner Maine, From Status to Contract, in ANCIENT LAW (1861) (showing the evolutionary
path of historical legal development that famously introduced Maine).
57 See MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY ch. III (Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich eds., 1968).
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legally irrelevant; and fifth, that every social action of human
beings must always be visualized as either an “application” or
“execution” of legal propositions, or as an “infringement”
thereof, since the “gaplessness” of the legal system must result
in a gapless “legal ordering” of all social conduct.58
Weber distinguished the systemic rationalization of legal formalism in civil
law countries from the piecemeal, judge-made, writ-based historical
development of the common law. The development of “legal science,” as
discussed in late nineteenth-century American law schools, never could
structurally embrace the systematic developments of “legal science” as liberally
borrowed from continental, particularly German, legal discourse.59 Gaps
appeared, although somewhat earlier than common doctrinal presentations
admit. These gaps represented stress fractures in the application of formalist
principles given the contradictory interface between American republican virtue
and the originary problems of chattel slavery and how to deal with indigenous
peoples.
Whether influenced by common or civil law, historicists nevertheless
distinguished themselves from natural law advocates, whom historicists claimed
applied rational principles of justice and morality through speculative sources
external to law. Formalists would adapt German historicist influences; however,
they would reorient law’s deducibility away from the abstract touchstone of
morality and toward law’s internal self-sufficiency as uncovered by judges. An
economic offshoot of their legal school broadened formalism’s appeal and
penetrated America in the 1870s and 1880s through the teachings of Germantrained economists, who emphasized the historical power of place-based
statistics to inform industrial and commercial policy.60
Former judge and University of Chicago law scholar Richard Posner
described legal formalism as the theory that “once lawmakers produce rules,
judges should apply them to the facts of a case without regard to social interests
and public policy.”61 Legal philosopher David Lyons labeled formalism as an
expression of the sufficiency of law as a means for deciding any case that arises:
“There are no ‘gaps’ within the law, and there is but one sound legal decision
for each case. The law is complete and univocal.”62 This is the “fixed and final
form” Roscoe Pound influentially criticized as the expression of “mechanical

58 Id. at 657–58.
59 BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, BEYOND THE FORMALIST-REALIST DIVIDE: THE ROLE OF POLITICS IN JUDGING
26 (2009).
60 Joseph Dorfman, The Role of the German Historical School in American Economic Thought, 45 AM.
ECON. REV. 17, 1717 (1955); Panayotis G. Michaelides & John G. Milos, Joseph Schumpeter and the
German Historical School, 33 J. ECON. 495, 507 (2009) (discussing key elements of Schumpeter’s
relation to the German historical school, including the construction of economics as a social science
based in part on economic statics). For an argument on the heterodoxy of the movement, making it
neither German nor historical, see Heath Pearson, Was There Really a German Historical School of
Economics?, HIST. POL. ECON. 547, 547–62 (1999).
61 RICHARD A. POSNER, REFLECTIONS ON JUDGING 4–5 (2013).
62 David Lyons, Legal Formalism and Instrumentalism-a Pathological Study, 66 CORNELL L. REV. 949,
950 (1981).
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jurisprudence,” where the rules were as fixed as Procrustes’ iron bed,63 and the
“cases were to be fitted [mechanically shortened or stretched] to the rules.”64
Pound’s critique, along with many foes of the formalist period, attacked the
“rigidly doctrinaire” style of syllogistic reasoning that misapplied abstract first
principles to produce socially unacceptable results.65
Legal philosopher Ernest Weinrib referred to this hallmark gap-avoiding
attribute of formalism as immanence. “By suggesting that the rationality of law
lies in a moral order immanent to legal material,” Weinrib held that formalism
presented a self-contained internalist dimension—a provenance of plenitude or
immanent moral rationality—where “juridical content can somehow sustain
itself from within,”66 where “law has a content that is not imported from without
but elaborated from within.”67 Therefore, the art of legal creativity actually
restricted law ascertainment to a process of discovery, “most naturally expressed
in adjudication,” through the internal application of pre-existing rules or
principles to an emergent or ever-changing fact pattern.68 This understanding of
formalism—as a conscious form of rule application employed from normative
principles internal to law—naturally emphasized the judicial process and the role
of the judge.69 Immanence promoted self-contained thinking, an “anglophone
conception of law . . . tied into a sense of community values that could be
objectively identified,”70 where answers arose from unassuming connections to
conquest and expansion, not from external considerations related to displaced
human geography.
A. FORMALISM’S FERTILE GROUND
Formalism found fertile ground in the United States after the American Civil
War and “rose to its zenith at the turn of the century,”71 roughly the same period
that the European profession of international law began to take shape. American
common law’s reliance on the “unique” role of judges (“generic to the whole
western world”) and the capitalist form of business enterprise also began to
converge.72 This braiding of institutions facilitated formalism’s domestic and
international interface, while contributing to ending the “explosive

63 In Greek mythology, Procrustes resolved tensions of life by stretching or shortening the customer to
perfectly fit suit (metaphorically cast as an iron bed), never pausing to consider the possibility of
tailoring the suit to fit the customer. See generally NASSIM NICHOLAS TALEB, THE BED OF
PROCRUSTES: PHILOSOPHICAL AND PRACTICAL APHORISMS xi—xii (2016).
64 Roscoe Pound, Mechanical Jurisprudence, 8 COLUM. L. REV. 605, 607 (1908).
65 Charles C. Goetsch, The Future of Legal Formalism, 24 AM J. LEG. HIST. 221, 221–22 (1980).
66 Weinrib, supra note 47, at 955.
67 Id. at 956.
68 Id.
69 See William E. Nelson, Judge Weinfeld and the Adjudicatory Process: A Law Finder in an Age of
Judicial Lawmakers, 50 N.Y.U. L. REV. 980, 982 (1975) (discussing “fact judge,” Judge Edward
Weinfeld, and the formalist application of law).
70 PAUL MCHUGH, ABORIGINAL SOCIETIES AND THE COMMON LAW: A HISTORY OF SOVEREIGNTY,
STATES, AND SELF-DETERMINATION 30 (2004).
71 Goetsch, supra note 65, at 221. For contemporary depictions of the classical formalists, see, e.g.,
Duxbury, supra note 49, at 9; GARY MINDA, POSTMODERN LEGAL MOVEMENTS: LAW AND
JURISPRUDENCE AT CENTURY’S END 13–33 (1995); ROBERT SAMUEL SUMMERS, INSTRUMENTALISM
AND AMERICAN LEGAL THEORY 136–59 (1982).
72 Max Lerner, The Supreme Court and American Capitalism, 42 YALE L.J. 668 (1933).
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contradictions” of plantation agrarianism and industrial capitalism’s coexistence
in one country.73
During this period, if not slightly before, a market-oriented transformation
in American law also began to separate the common law from its previous
concerns for the “substantive fairness of economic exchange;” American
common law became “facilitative of individual desires” and reflective of
economic and political power.74 Land hunger already had motivated the drive to
establish frontier settlements over the Appalachian Mountains, in violation of
England’s Royal Proclamation (1763) prohibiting colonists’ land-grabbing
migration over the range.75 Claims to land appropriation, fueled by a burgeoning
sense of Manifest Destiny, followed with the passage of the Northwest
Ordinance (1787),76 the Louisiana Purchase (1803),77 the acquisition of West,78
then Spanish Florida (1819),79 the state-based, then federally-supported
domination of the Native southeast and the removal the so-called Five Civilized
Tribes (1830),80 the secession and annexation of Tejas (Texas, 1836; 1845),81
the takeover of the Spanish southwest in the Mexican-American War (18461848),82 and the westward movement into Oregon Territory (1850).83
Historian Greg Grandin metaphorically viewed this westward expansion as
the “gate of escape,” the ever-expanding spatial portal deployed by the newborn,
racially conflicted country to dominate land while forestalling confrontation
with the contradictions of its own republican mythos.84 By the end of the
nineteenth century, historian Frederick Jackson Turner had located fully-formed
American virtues in this expansionary spatial domain. These virtues were not
inherited from European forbearers, they were bequeathed from internal, rugged,
pragmatic, individualistic encounters with spatial engagements on the expanding

73 Jason W. Moore, Remaking Work, Remaking Space: Spaces of Production and Accumulation in the
Reconstruction of American Capitalism, 1865–1920, 34 ANTIPODE 176, 177 (2002).
74 MORTON HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780–1860 253 (1977).
75 See Royal Proclamation, 1763, INDIGENOUS FOUNDATIONS,
https://indigenousfoundations.arts.ubc.ca/royal_proclamation_1763/ (prohibiting colonial settlements
west of the Appalachian Mountains, prohibiting molestation of Native Tribes and protecting traditional
tribal hunting grounds. The Proclamation followed England’s defeat of France and its Native North
American allies in the Seven Years War (1756–1763).
76 See generally PETER S. ONUF, STATEHOOD AND UNION: A HISTORY OF THE NORTHWEST ORDINANCE
(2019) (discussing the Ordinance following its July 13, 1787 adoption in terms of a blueprint for an
American empire of continental dimensions).
77 See generally Louisiana Purchase: Primary Documents in American History, LIB. CONG.
https://guides.loc.gov/louisiana-purchase/digital-collections (last visited Dec. 9, 2020) (showcasing
seminal documents associated with territorial acquisition).
78 See generally ISAAC JOSLIN COX, THE WEST FLORIDA CONTROVERSY, 1798–1813: A STUDY IN
AMERICAN DIPLOMACY (1918) (discussing the thirty-seven year now-misnamed border dispute
between Spain and the United States over control of the Apalachicola and Mississippi river outlets).
79 Culminating in the Treaty of Adams-Onis (1819), 8 Stat. 252; TS 327; 11 Bevans 528; 3 Miller 3
(1819), including the U.S. annexation of West Florida (1810, later becoming part of eastern Louisiana).
80 See generally ANGIE DEBO, AND STILL THE WATERS RUN: THE BETRAYAL OF THE FIVE CIVILIZED
TRIBES (1940) (presenting a leading historical account of the removal of the Five Civilized Tribes).
81 See generally JUSTIN H. SMITH, THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS (1911) (presenting an acclaimed history
of Texas).
82 See generally K. JACK BAUER, THE MEXICAN WAR, 1846–1848 (1995) (presenting a leading military
history of the war, which is described as unavoidable).
83 Oregon Donation Land Act, 9 Stat. 496 (1850).
84 GREG GRANDIN, THE END OF THE MYTH: FROM THE FRONTIER TO THE BORDER WALL IN THE MIND
OF AMERICA 43 (2019).
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American frontier.85 They presented a unique and internal “American” rationale
for spatial domination, which germinated seedlings of formalism.
As the problematic international law theorist Carl Schmitt later framed the
connection,86 the question of place inextricably connected soil (Boden) to law
formation. In line with Lockean and Kantian conceptions of proprietary
entitlement,87 the concurrent processes of land appropriation (Landnahme)
worked by human hands, demarcated by engravements embedded in soil and
land division, created the immediate means by which people made spatially
visible their political and social order. The European act of cultivation and
enclosure, clearing and planting, became important measures by which Native
claims to place were denied.88 The perception of Natives’ nomadic way of life,
which did not improve the land or make spatially visible their claim of
dominium, contrasted with Jeffersonian Enlightenment philosophy and his
Euclidean Public Land Survey System,89 Christianity’s civilizing mission, and
biblical directive.90
Schmitt attributed psychological qualities to this land cultivation, separating
nihilistic and abstract normative threats to one’s spatial orientation from the
concrete, personal attachments that grow out of law’s more properly nurtured,
bounded space. “True law,” according to Schmitt, arose through the division and
situation of space through telluric touchstones. In a word, he called it nomos.91
If separated from this proper foundation, if adulterated by a distinctly political
formulation, Schmitt forewarned of the hegemonic consequence of a Großraum,
85 Frederick J. Turner, The Significance of the Frontier in American History, in ANNUAL REPORT OF THE
AMERICAN HISTORICAL ASSOCIATION, 1893 (1894) (presenting the historiographically significant
Frontier Thesis).
86 Although noted for his brilliance and for an emerging wealth of attention to his theories, Schmitt was
deplored as the Crown Jurist (Kronjurist) of the Third Reich. Ernst Jünger coined the moniker in 1943.
Schmitt had joined the Nazi Party in 1933, and was detained, interrogated, and released by American
authorities, who contemplated putting Schmitt in the docket at the Nuremberg War Crimes Tribunal.
See generally REINHARD MEHRING, CARL SCHMITT: A BIOGRAPHY (Daniel Steuer trans., 2014)
(dispelling the thesis that Schmitt merely paid lip service to the
Third Reich); JOSEPH J. BENDERSKY, CARL SCHMITT: THEORIST FOR THE REICH (1983) (affirming
Schmitt’s status as one of the most significant political theorists of the twentieth century and the most
controversial).
87 See Christopher R. Rossi, The Nomos of Climate Change and the Sociological Refugee in a Sinking
Century, 50 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 613, 620–21 (2018) (comparing Schmittian, Lockean, and
Kantian perspectives on land appropriation).
88 The presidency of Andrew Jackson reflected this possessory claim as a defense for removing eastern
Natives across the Mississippi River. See DAVID W. MILLER, THE TAKING OF AMERICAN INDIAN
LANDS IN THE SOUTHEAST: A HISTORY OF TERRITORIAL CESSIONS AND FORCED RELOCATIONS, 16071840, at 175 (2011) (quoting as an example Jackson’s War Secretary, Lewis Cass: “the Creator
intended the earth should be reclaimed from a state of nature and cultivated; that . . . a tribe of
wandering hunters . . . have a very imperfect possession of the country over which they roam.”).
89 In 1785, Jefferson developed the Public Land Survey System, a land-based latticework which greatly
facilitated the creation of a relentless grid to dispose of lands of the western territories. See 1785 - The
Public Land Survey System (PLSS), American Period Maps, USGS 1, 4 (2017),
https://digitalcommons.csumb.edu/hornbeck_usa_1/23.
90 See A. Whitney Griswold, The Agrarian Democracy of Thomas Jefferson, 40 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 657,
661 (1946) (quoting Jefferson’s 1785 missive whereby he claimed “[t]he earth is given as a common
stock to labour and live on”); STEVEN L. JAMES, NEW CREATION ESCHATOLOGY AND THE LAND: A
SURVEY OF CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVES 52 (2017) (noting ‘land’ and the “growing appreciation
of territorial orientation” is the “fourth most frequent noun or substantive in the Old Testament”);
Genesis 1:28 (English Standard version) (“[b]e fruitful and multiply and fill the earth and subdue it,
and have dominion over the fish of the sea and over the birds . . . and over every living thing.”).
91 CARL SCHMITT, THE NOMOS OF THE EARTH IN THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE JUS PUBLICUM
EUROPAEUM 66–69 (2006) (discussing nomos, nihilism, and the place-based origins of true law).
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which he specifically pinpointed in the form of the Monroe Doctrine and
liberalism’s twentieth century pursuit of undifferentiated (raumlose) universal
values. These values, according to Schmitt, became virulent; they metastasized
the telluric and bounded mythos of Turner’s romanticized frontier thesis,
spreading a new form of hegemony while destroying Schmitt’s equally
cherished mythos of the bounded space he called the jus publicum Europaeum.92
Critics of transglobalism regard Schmitt’s “multi-faceted political and spatial
theories” as a polemic against technocratic capitalism, the displacement of
indigenous peoples, and neoliberalism’s general abnegation of personhood. 93
B. FORMALISM’S ALLIANCE WITH COMMON LAW AND LEGAL PROFESSIONALISM
The development of American common law reflected the spatial bequeaths
of frontier mentality and European heritage. In the mid-nineteenth century, an
alliance between the legal profession and commercial interests overturned
paternalistic and anti-development common law values. The rise of legal
formalism helped to establish the supremacy of the right of contract. This
offshoot of individualism transformed the public purpose doctrine, which
limited government takings of private property for public use, and turned it into
a commercially friendly adjunct of economic entrepreneurialism for the
administration of public lands.94 It also promoted the politics and economics of
land acquisition, as well, and large-scale Indian removal during the long
nineteenth century.95
Sixteenth-century Spain applied a remotely similar proto-corporatist form
of legal entrepreneurialism—divisible sovereignty—to capture newfound
wealth in the Americas and to spatially divide millions of hectares of territory
described as terra ultra incognita.96 The empire’s political subdivisions, called
viceroyalties, relied on a system of private capital to extract gold and silver
through the issuance of land titles purchased by entrusted Spanish noblemen,
called encomenderos. This charter system, which established a central royal
authority-by-proxy system, was overseen by a judicial board, the Council of the
Indies (1524). Hemispheric control would thereafter unveil in a series of
subdivisions. These partitions vested legal authority and administrative control
in the operations of captaincies-general, presidencies, judicial and
92 Schmitt introduced the concept in a lecture before the Institute for Politics and international Law at
the University of Kiel, weeks after the Nazi invasion of Czechoslovakia. See CARL SCHMITT,
VÖLKERRECHTLICHE GROSSRAUMORDNUNG MIT INTERVENTIONSVERBOT FÜR RAUMFREMDE
MÄCHTE: EIN BEITRAG ZUM REICHSBEGRIFF IM VÖLKERRECHT (1939). Although often literally
translated as “great space,” Schmitt’s usage of Großraum more properly meant sphere of influence or
geopolitical space. See Stuart Elden, Reading Schmitt Geopolitically: Nomos, Territory and Großraum,
161 RADICAL PHILOSOPHY 18, 19 (2010).
93 Rossi, supra note 87, at 630; see also id. at 631 (discussing how critics of transglobal capitalism read
Schmitt).
94 Morton J. Horwitz, The Rise of Legal Formalism, 19 AM J. L. HIST. 251, 251 (1975).
95 Robbie Ethridge, Reflections on the Long Nineteenth Century and Indian Removal, 17 AMERICAN
NINETEENTH CENTURY HISTORY 241 (2016). The “long” nineteenth century, so described, began with
the rumblings of Native removal, which could be heard in the late eighteenth century and which
“stretched well into the late nineteenth century and beyond.”
96 See Martin Waldseemüller, Universalis Cosmographia Secundum Ptholomaei Traditionem et Americi
Vespucii Alioru[m]que Lustrationes, St. Dié, 1507, Geography & Map Reading Room, THE LIBRARY
OF CONGRESS, https://www.loc.gov/rr/geogmap/waldexh.html (naming for the first time the New
World as “America” and portraying much of the interior landscape as “terra ultra incognita”).
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administrative high courts (audiencias), and additional subunits, including rural
districts, or corregimientos, magistrateships (alcaldías mayor), governorates
(gobernaciónes), and subdelegaciones—all of which reflected imported Iberian
hierarchical and socio-economic spatial arrangements that required classes of
compradors, bureaucrats, and visitadors to administer.97 This “first step in the
reconstruction of the Atlantic” and of the world98 facilitated the territorial
division of the New World and provided the proto-contours of legal formalism
that would take hold after the retreat of the metropolitan powers in the early
nineteenth century. The influential anthropologist and Native American scholar,
Edward Spicer, reduced this spatial reordering to the fundamental observation
that the cycle of imperial conquest of the Americas repeatedly overrode Native
belief systems. Natives never accepted the fungibility of land or the dissoluble
nature of the “bond between themselves and the land.”99
Native interests were not solely affected by this transition. According to
American legal historian, Morton Horwitz, “[b]y the middle of the nineteenth
century the legal system had been reshaped to the advantage of men of
commerce and industry at the expense of farmers, workers, consumers, and other
less powerful groups within the society . . . . The rise of legal formalism . . . fully
correlated with the attainment of these substantive legal changes,”100 and its
acceptance reoriented spatial conceptions of law’s domain.
According to Horowitz, “[m]ost of the basic dichotomies in legal thought of
the nineteenth century—between law and politics, law and morality, objective
and subjective standards, distributional and allocation goals—arose to establish
the objective nature of the market and to neutralize and hence defuse the political
and redistributional potential of law.”101 Legal formalism’s emergence inclined
common law toward this standard of objectivity, and this transformation
dramatically rearranged society. The transformation helped to solidify the
professional standing of American legal practitioners, who self-represented as
experts in the objective discernment and politically-neutral application of legal
rules.102 The voice of this self-representation took the form of bar associations,
which became more prominent around this time first in cities, then states, and
shortly thereafter, nationally with the founding of the American Bar Association
in 1878.103
97 CHRISTOPHER R. ROSSI, REMOTENESS RECONSIDERED: THE ATACAMA DESERT AND INTERNATIONAL
LAW 19-20 (2021).
98 Amy Turner Bushnell & Jack P. Greene, Peripheries, Centers, and the Construction of Early Modern
American Empires: An Introduction, NEGOTIATED EMPIRES: CENTERS AND PERIPHERIES IN THE
AMERICAS, 1500-1820, at 1 (Christine Daniels & Michael V. Kennedy, eds., 2002).
99 EDWARD H. SPICER, CYCLES OF CONQUEST: THE IMPACT OF SPAIN, MEXICO, AND THE UNITED
STATES ON THE INDIANS OF THE SOUTHWEST 576 (1962).
100 HORWITZ, supra note 74, at 253–54.
101 Id. at 256.
102 See id. at 256–57.
103 The Galveston Bar Association formed first in 1868, followed by city associations in New York City
(1870) and St. Louis (1874). The Iowa State Bar Association followed in 1874, and the American Bar
Association formed in 1878. Simeon E. Baldwin, The Founding of the American Bar, 3 A.B.A. J. 658
(1917) (discussing the history of American bar associations). While the movement to professionalize
the practice of law around the 1870s seems not to be in dispute, discussion as to the where and when
“law associations” began to form remains somewhat of a question. Mississippi had something of an
association as early as 1824, and an association of short duration seems to have formed in
Massachusetts in 1849. Additionally, Philadelphia may have a claim as the oldest city bar association
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The modern American professional practice of law congealed during legal
formalism’s rise around the 1870s. It built on an increase in lawyer demand,
which census material indicated began to grow in 1850.104 The former and looseknit apprenticeship system that socialized lawyers into the trade gave way in the
latter part of the nineteenth century to the reading of law through university law
schools.105 And it was through the development of rigorous and standardized
legal education that the trade transformed into a profession—a transformation
that would also ripple across the landscape of American graduate education as
universities increasingly came to embrace German pedagogical influences.106
Part of formalism’s rise is well understood: From 1870 to 1895, Christopher
Columbus Langdell served as Dean of Harvard Law School. There, he
systematized American legal education through the study of settled cases.107 He
applied that practice to contract law and introduced the case method, 108 along
with the Socratic method, which relied on repetitive questioning to tacitly reveal
ignorance as a means of motivating student inquiry.109 This methodology
profoundly influenced the formalist pedagogy of American law. In his
pathbreaking textbook on contracts, Langdell espoused the revelatory power of
legal formalism, whereby “[l]aw, considered as a science, consist[ed] of certain
principles or doctrines” reducible and ascertainable through the case method of
study.110 To Langdell, the ascertainment of law involved a process of discovery,
which lent itself to principles of scientific method, no better exemplified than by
the teachings of Yale Law scholar, Walter Wheeler Cook, who professed the
application of rational, mathematical principles to the study of law.111
Formalism presented the thesis of classical orthodoxy and its antithesis
became known as legal realism.112 Formalism emphasized the role of the judge

(1802), followed by New Orleans. However, name changes, fragmentary proceedings, and
realignments cloud this history. See A.J. Small, Historical Sketch of the Early Iowa State Bar
Association, PROCEEDINGS OF THE IOWA STATE BAR ASSOCIATION 9–10 (1912).
104 Richard L. Abel, The Transformation of the American Legal Profession, 20 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 7, 8
(1986) (discussing the 1870s as the beginning of the contemporary American legal profession and
“lawyer demand”).
105 A. Christopher Bryant, Reading the Law in the Office of Calvin Fletcher: The Apprenticeship System
and the Practice of Law in Frontier Indiana, 1 NEV. L.J. 19, 21 (2001).
106 See Steven Muller, Wilhelm von Humboldt and the University in the United States, 6 JOHNS HOPKINS
APL TECH. DIG. 253 (1985) (discussing the 1876 founding of The Johns Hopkins University based on
Wilhelm von Humboldt’s precepts of scientific inquiry and the unity of teaching and research).
107 See generally Marcia Speziale, Langdell’s Concept of Law as Science: The Beginning of AntiFormalism in American Legal Theory, 5 VT. L. REV. 1 (1980) (discussing debates arising from
Langdell’s understanding of law as a fixed body of knowledge and his underrepresented complexity
as possibly the first anti-Langdellian).
108
See
The
Case
Study
Teaching
Method,
HARVARD
LAW
SCHOOL,
https://casestudies.law.harvard.edu/the-case-study-teaching-method/ (last visited Dec. 18, 2020).
109 James C. Overholser, Elements of the Socratic Method: I. Systematic Questioning, 30
PSYCHOTHERAPY 67 (1993).
110 CHRISTOPHER C. LANGDELL, SELECTION OF CASES ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS vi (1871).
111 Charles E. Clark, Walter Wheeler Cook, 38 Ill. L. REV. 341, 342 (1944).
See generally Walter W. Cook, Scientific Method and the Law, 13 A.B.A. J. 303 (1927). U.S. Circuit
Court of Appeals judge, and former Yale Law Dean, Charles Clark, noted Cook’s objective approach
owing to Cook’s teaching background in fields of physics and mathematics. Charles E. Clark, Walter
Wheeler Cook, 38 ILL. L. REV. 341, 342 (1944).
112 See Thomas C. Grey, Langdell’s Orthodoxy, 45 U. PITT. L. REV. 3 (1983) (referencing legal realism
[modern American legal thought] as the antithesis to classical orthodoxy principally represented by
Oliver Wendell Holmes’ famous aphorism: “The life of the law has not been logic; it has been
experience.”) (internal citations omitted).
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and the adjudication process as the autonomous means of determining the one
and only outcome of a case, unadulterated by nonlegal normative considerations
of law or political philosophy. Formalism emphasized the deductive correctness
of a decision whereas realism emphasized the sociological soundness of a
decision.113 American legal realism attacked formalism’s purported acontextual,
un-sociological and “mechanical” devotion to rationalism. The legal realist
movement gained prominence in the 1920s and 1930s and included American
judicial luminaries such as Oliver Wendell Holmes,114 Roscoe Pound,115
Benjamin Cardozo,116 Eugen Ehrlich,117 and Karl Llewellyn.118 Powerful
European contributions were made by Axel Hägerström’s Uppsala School
(which included Karl Olivecrona and Vilhelm Lundstedt) and most significantly,
Hägerström’s student and chief representative of Scandinavian legal realism,
Alf Ross.119 Legal realism responded to the dissonance caused by formalism’s
derivation of applicable rules, and the dispute continues. Recently, Jean
d’Aspremont has attempted to refresh support of formalism out of concern that
the movement to deformalize international law results in greater indeterminacy
and ambiguity as to the ascertainment of proper law. To guard against the rise
of quasi-law, his attention has turned to the organic and shared written or
linguistic indicators found in the practice of international law, for instance, in
the ritualistic language of Security Council, which fortifies formalistic law
determination.120
C. THE PROBLEM OF PERIODIZING FORMALISM
In 1974, Yale University law professor Grant Gilmore delivered the
influential Storrs lecture that produced his book, The Ages of American Law
(1977), which has been acclaimed as the “most influential modern formulation”

113 See Posner, supra note 50, at 181 (contrasting formalism’s concern for correct and incorrect decisions
versus realism’s assessment of decisions based on sound or unsound reasoning).
114 See generally Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457 (1897).
115 See generally Roscoe Pound, Mechanical Jurisprudence, 8 COLUM. L. REV. 605 (1908).
116 See generally BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1921); See also
BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE GROWTH OF THE LAW (1924); See also BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE
PARADOXES OF LEGAL SCIENCE (1928).
117 See generally EUGEN EHRLICH, FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF THE SOCIOLOGY OF LAW (Walter L.
Moll trans., 1936).
118 His primary works include Karl Llewellyn, A Realistic Jurisprudence–The Next Step, 30 COLUM. L.
REV. 431 (1930); see also KARL N. LLEWELLYN, BRAMBLE BUSH: SOME LECTURES ON LAW AND ITS
STUDY (1930); see also Karl Llewellyn, Some Realism about Realism: Responding to Dean Pound, 44
HARV. L. REV. 1222 (1931); see also KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION:
DECIDING APPEALS (1960). Other distinguished jurists fitting this mold, according to Richard Posner
(who doubtless meets this qualitative assessment and subscribes to it as well) include Louis Brandeis,
Learned Hand, Robert Jackson, Roger Traynor, and Henry Friendly. WILLIAM TWINING, KARL
LLEWELLYN AND THE REALIST MOVEMENT (1973); see POSNER, supra note 61, at 2.
119 See generally ALF ROSS, TOWARDS A REALISTIC JURISPRUDENCE: A CRITICISM OF THE DUALISM IN
LAW (1946); see also ALF ROSS, ON LAW AND JUSTICE (1959). The latter work, regarded as his most
important, appeared first in Danish, OM RET OG RETFAERDIGHED, in 1953, and devoted considerable
attention to “legal politics” and the “applied sociology of law.” Ross also wrote the highly regarded A
TEXTBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (1947); see also Mauro Zamboni, Alf Ross’s Legal Philosophy,
A TREATISE OF LEGAL PHILOSOPHY AND GENERAL JURISPRUDENCE 401, 402 (E. Pattaro & C. Roversi
eds., 2016) (for an account of Ross’s intellectual debt to Hägerström while departing from his
teachings).
120 See generally JEAN D’ASPREMONT, FORMALISM AND THE SOURCES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW—A
THEORY OF THE ASCERTAINMENT OF LEGAL RULES (2011).
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of legal formalism.121 Gilmore located a judicial turn toward formalism—away
from the “Grand Style” of judicial flexibility that held sway since the
Revolution—after the Civil War. “The post-Civil War juridical product”
construed “law as a closed, logical system” that restricted the judicial function
to discovering the extent that “true rules . . . are and indeed always have been.”122
Gilmore’s periodization of the Formalist Age generated criticism. Brian
Tamanaha called it “dubious.”123 He dated law’s ability to “furnish a rule of
decision for every case . . . a mere fiction,”124 as early as 1833. Tamanaha also
implicated Jerome Frank and his important work, Law and the Modern Mind
(1930) for perpetuating the “[b]asic [l]egal [m]yth” of the completeness of the
common law,125 and for distorting the view of early twentieth century Harvard
Law and Chicago Law Dean Joseph Beale by characterizing him “as the leading
contemporary representative of conceiving of law as composed of unchanging
principles.”126
Periodization questions infiltrate the study of history. However, the critique
of formalism’s reliance on immanence—the internalist dimension of the judicial
function that deduced applicable legal principles to create a gapless legal
order—contained inherent conflicts between republican virtue and the spatial
dynamics of chattel slavery and Indian removal. These two features of the
hemispheric encounter with colonialism predate Professor Gilmore’s
periodization of formalism and its rise after the Civil War.
D. FORMALISM’S PARALLEL MOVEMENT IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND SEEDLINGS
OF CROSS-OVER
When discussing antecedents to formalism’s rise in America, it is important
to note that a parallel movement arose in public international law and launched
on the continent around the 1860s and 1870s, partially supporting the Gilmore
thesis removed to the plane of international legal discourse. As discussed by
Martti Koskenniemi, an esprit d’internationalité began to solidify around the
professionalized practice of international law. This spirit arose first through the
scholarly articles presented in the Revue de Droit International et de Législation
Comparée, first published in 1868, and then with the founding of the Institut de
droit international in 1873, by what Koskenniemi referred to as a new breed—
the ‘Men of 1873’. Leaders of this movement—such as the Belgian jurist and
editor, Gustave Rolin-Jaequemyns; the holder of the Whewell Chair of
International Law at Cambridge University, John Westlake; and the Swiss
historicist, Johann Bluntschli—sought out a more systematic articulation of
international legal science during this so-called belle époque.127 By this time,
Frédéric Passy had organized in 1867 the Société des Amis de la Paix (renamed

121 TAMANAHA, supra note 59, at 17, 19.
122 GRANT GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 62 (1977).
123 TAMANAHA, supra note, 59 at 17.
124 Id. at 18 (quoting an 1833 article on “Written and Unwritten Systems of Law”).
125 Id. at 14.
126 Id. at 16. Tamanaha argued that Beale’s position was far more pragmatic than the “purely
conceptualist position” attributed to him by Frank.
127 See generally MARTTI KOSKENNIEMI, THE GENTLE CIVILIZER OF NATIONS–THE RISE AND FALL OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 1870-1960 (2001). Mikael Rask Madsen, Book Review: The Gentle Civilizer of
Nations, 47 ACTA SOCIOLOGICA 105 (2004) (reviewing the “belle epoque” and the Men of 1973).
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in 1889 the Société française pour l’arbitrage entre nations), which essentially
launched the international peace movement. Passy’s movement promoted a
belief in the maturation of international law. It marked an important milestone
in the rise of internationalism and new-born international organizations. For his
efforts, Passy would receive the 1901 Nobel Peace Prize.128
Historian Irwin Abrams wrote of two other “momentous events” in the
1870s that fortified the development of the internationalist agenda. The first was
the Franco-Prussian War (1870-1871), which involved techniques of counterinsurgency that prompted calls to constrain war. The second was the arbitral
resolution of a dispute between England and the United States regarding the
Alabama Claims (1871-1872),129 which reinforced the credibility of third party
dispute resolution.130
The rapid expansion of positive law and the professionalization of the legal
practice warranted retrospective appreciation for the nineteenth century as the
Golden Age of International Law, a commonplace ascription supported mostly
by its “constant reiteration,” but not without doctrinal support. International
legal theorist Nicholas Onuf claimed Lassa Oppenheim, Hersch Lauterpacht,
J.L. Brierly, and Hans Kelsen figured importantly in the extension of this age
into the twentieth century, which, given their late nineteenth century intellectual
upbringing, “had not yet come to a close.”131 Several of these accounts
emphasized the supreme standing of the state as the unit of analysis in
international relations. Charles Hyde’s 1922 treaties even went so far as to deny
that tribal peoples ever held any juridical personality.132 According to Paul
McHugh, “[t]his absolutist, highly positivistic approach . . . was symptomatic of
the intellectual climate of the time, where it was believed that law could be
scientifically identified and applied, and in retrospect of which the sovereignty
of the territorial state was the notional foundation.”133
David Kennedy critically attacked formalism’s contribution to the Golden
Age and the historical illusions it supported: the distinction between public and
private law; the international and the national; the sovereign and the individual;
together with the “untroubled practice of deductive legal reasoning.”134 He
reduced formalism to a set of unwitting contradictions, making its adherents
anti-moderns—“creatures of faith, their international law an elaborate legal
paganism.”135

128 Frédéric Passy, THE NOBEL PRIZE, https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/peace/1901/passy/facts/ (last
visited Dec. 19, 2020).
129 Irwin Abrams, The Emergence of the International Law Societies, 19 REV. POL. 361, 363–64 (1957).
130 Tom Bingham, The Alabama Claims Arbitration, 54 INT’L COMP. L. Q. 1, 24 (2005) (connecting the
success of the arbitration to Gustave Moynier’s 1872 proposal to establish a permanent international
criminal court, the call to enhance the effectiveness of international arbitration at the Hague
Conferences of 1899 and 1907, and the creation of the Permanent Court of Arbitration and the
Permanent Court of International Justice).
131 Nicholas Onuf, Henry Wheaton and “The Golden Age of International Law,” 6 INT’L L. THEORY 2
(2008).
132 MCHUGH, supra note 70, at 291 (referencing CHARLES HYDE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AS
INTERPRETED AND APPLIED BY THE UNITED STATES 163–64 (1922)).
133 Id.
134 David Kennedy, International Law and the Nineteenth Century: History of an Illusion, 17 Q.L.R. 99,
133-34 (1997-1998).
135 Id. at 134.
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Perhaps no better illustration of the contradictions of this age arises with the
publication of Henry Wheaton’s Elements of International Law (1836), the first
English language treatise devoted to international law. The eighth edition
appeared in 1866 with Richard Henry Dana serving as editor, and it achieved
canonical status as the leading international text of its age.136 Its publication on
the cusp of the Golden Age and its Men of 1873 helped to secure a respected
North American doctrinal voice among the core of newborn European
international legal elites. It has been characterized alternatively as a cogent and
complete explanation for the rise of liberal internationalism and the practical and
moral addition to international law’s enshrinement of colonialism.137
Wheaton benefitted from the rational re-working of English common law,
principally William Blackstone’s Commentaries on the Laws of England (4 vol.,
1765-1769), and from the writings of James Kent, Chancellor of the New York
State Court of Chancery. In 1826, Kent published the first of the fourteen
editions of his Commentaries on American Law, which systemized a mature
American approach to common law based on American precedent in addition to
English customary law.138 At the same time, Kent praised the “vast superiority”
of the western Christian tradition for providing the foundation for North
American strength.139 Kent also devoted two hundred pages to his emerging
American formulation of international law.140 David Bederman further located
elements of Wheaton’s dualism in Joseph Story’s publication of Conflicts of
Laws (1834), which Bederman described as a “crucial moment” in the elevation
of “a territorial basis for resolving conflicts.”141 “Story’s move to a territorial
basis for resolving conflicts . . . was critical in establishing a difference between
private and public international law. Henceforth, territorial sovereigns began to
regard themselves as unrestrained by international law to decide such matters as
prescriptive and adjudicatory jurisdiction.”142
Wheaton’s formulation of international law was not as segmented as Story’s
public and private spheres. He presented an “admixture of natural and positive
sources for obligation, of moral restraint and positive consent.143 His empirical
pragmatism, in part, moved away from the rising tide of Continental formalism
and “positivist absolutism.”144 He recognized a society of independent nations
that tethered law and justice to the promotion of the idea of community.
However, he remained “overwhelming[ly] commit[ted] to states, as the sole
subjects of international law.”145 What made international law congeal in

136 Mortimer Sellers, The Element of International Law, in REPUBLICAN PRINCIPLES IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW 1, 72 (2006).
137 Onuf, supra note 131, at 4 (noting both descriptions); Lydia H. Liu, Henry Wheaton (1785–1848), in
THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1132 (Bardo Fassbender & Anne
Peters eds., 2012) (associating Wheaton’s approach to international law with colonial expansion and
imperialism of the European powers).
138 See Carl F. Stychin, The Commentaries of Chancellor James Kent and the Development of an
American Common Law, 37 AM. J. LEG. HIST. 440, 443 (1993).
139 Mark Weston Janis, American Versions of the International Law of Christendom: Kent, Wheaton and
the Grotian Tradition, 39 NETH. INT’L L. REV. 37, 41 (1992).
140 Id.
141 David J. Bederman, Intellectual Genealogies, 6 INT’L L. THEORY 9, 11 (2008).
142 Id.
143 Id.
144 Id.
145 Sellers, supra note 136, at 77.
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Wheaton’s legal mind, according to Mark Janis, was the immanent morality of
Christianity and Western civilization,146 and the “circle of like-minded States
bound by common traditions of culture, law and morals.”147 Zhiguang Yin
claimed Wheaton thought “[b]eing a civilized nation [was] thus the foundation
for becoming a sovereign nation,” all of which came from the unity of
Christendom.148 Wheaton’s presentation of an American treatise on international
law helped to tie together disparate threads of immanent public and privatesphere rationality as initiated by Kent, Story, and the unfolding of the as yet
unnamed significance of American frontierism. To Paul McHugh, Wheaton’s
attachment to the standard of civilization achieved its full presence in AngloAmerican treatises from the second half of the nineteenth century, although the
germination of Wheaton’s support of the standard appear in the early part of the
nineteenth century.149
III. FORMALISM’S PROTO-PULLS: THE INTERNATIONAL SLAVE TRADE AND
INDIAN REMOVAL
Another part of formalism’s story involves its early nineteenth-century
hidden history, which predates its later nineteenth-century influence on
international law and the men of its Golden Age. Elements of formalism existed
in an ambivalent American legal psyche before the arrival of German historical
influences. They arose first in relation to the contradictions between newly
emergent republican ideals and the “peculiar institution” of slavery,150 and then
in relation to the rationalized means by which hundreds of treaty commitments
were abrogated to facilitate the Indian removal campaign east of the Mississippi
River and south of the Ohio River. Obvious inconsistencies in judicial treatments
of these issues indicated problems regarding formalism’s early ascertainment.
They also indicated tensions involving the derivation of guiding natural rights
principles in an increasingly positivistic and material hemispheric world.
Legal historian Mark Tushnet expressed slavery’s contradictions in terms of
dichotomies, never completely reconciled, between the rise of a northern,
industrial society based on bourgeoise law and its division of labor based on
market relations, and the sentimental totality of slave law and the social ordering
on an economic system based on paternalism and entitlement.151 According to
Tushnet, law’s growing “autonomy,” in the form of “generally shared
principles,” enforced the power of precedent as applied by “mediocre” judges
who felt constrained to construct approaches to law that reduced latent social
contradictions “to manageable proportions.”152 Within common law’s support
for upholding precedent, a legal structure of formalism began to take shape early

146 Janis, supra note 139, at 60.
147 Id. at 37.
148 Zhiguang Yin, Heavenly Principles? The Translation of International Law in nineteenth-century
China and the Constitution of Universality, 27 EUR. J. INT’L L. 1005, 1014 (2017).
149 MCHUGH, supra note 70, at 201.
150 The phrase comes from the title of the masterful work of KENNETH STAMPP, THE PECULIAR
INSTITUTION: SLAVERY IN THE ANTE-BELLUM SOUTH (1956).
151 See MARK V. TUSHNET, THE AMERICAN LAW OF SLAVERY, 1810-1860: CONSIDERATIONS OF
HUMANITY AND INTEREST 89 (1981) (introducing stylized categories of bourgeois and slave law).
152 Id. at 29.
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in the nineteenth century. Frontier expansion combined with a conflicted, but
forming, judicial mindset that inclined toward the rational supremacy of the
republic’s civilizing mission and its immanent entitlement to geospace. This
entitlement eventually contributed to the breaking of hundreds of treaty
obligations based on the rationalistic conversion of the sovereign status of
Native peoples to a condition of mere tenancy.
Formalism’s judicial construction also reflected the increasingly important
material economic concerns of the early nineteenth century. This material
component of formalism drew from the economics of human bondage and land
speculation associated with western expansion. It would widen from the ambit
of judge-made law to all spheres of private law, where it would turn private law
into an instrument of exchange. Formalism supported pro-entrepreneurial
revisions to contract, tort, conflicts of law, usury, and negotiability, and became
the engine for social and legal transformation. It could not but have an effect on
the construction of hemispheric international law.
Common law began to “encourage[] disguised forms of judicially
sanctioned economic redistribution,” which increased inequality yet promoted
freedom of exchange.153 According to Horwitz, formalism’s informal growth
from early parts of the nineteenth century created double pulls across private and
public spheres,154 no more starkly observed than in early nineteenth century
judicial struggles with the outlawry of the international slave trade, and the
debate over tribal sovereignty in the United States.155 While importation of
teachings from German legal science boosted formalism’s appeal in America,
nascent formalistic rationale established a parallel, preliminary foothold in
American juridical thought, although its ‘informal’ birth was disguised by
contradictions that juxtaposed American republican ideals and slavery, followed
by Indian removal.
This ambivalence regarding the outlawry of the international slave trade and
the sovereign status of Native American republics eventually contributed to the
rise of formalism by the mid-to-late nineteenth century, after which American
approaches to international law began to reinforce formalism’s hold world-wide.
Early expressions of formalism’s adherence to immanence and the internal, selfcontained sufficiency of law helped to reconcile stark ironies and contradictions

153 HORWITZ, supra note 94, at 255.
154 Id. at 256.
155 Compare Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832) (recognizing the Cherokee Nation as “a
distinct community occupying its own territory, with boundaries accurately described, in which the
laws of Georgia [allowing upon payment of a license fee whites to settle on Cherokee lands] can have
no force”), with Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810). In Fletcher, land speculators bribed
much of the Georgia legislature to sell off 35 million acres of western territory extending to the
Mississippi River (now Alabama and Mississippi). The sale impacted Native claims of dominion, as
well. Outraged by the graft and cheap sale of land in what became known as the Yazoo Land Fraud of
1795, Georgians elected a new legislature, which invalidated the original sale. This Rescinding Act
problematized relations with third-party purchasers, many located in Northern states. The Supreme
Court ruled Georgia’s repeal unconstitutionally infringed on federal protections guaranteed by the
Constitution’s Contract Clause, notwithstanding the fraudulent conveyance and claims of Native
Americans. Constitutional law scholar Sanford Levinson read the case as suggesting that Marshall was
motivated by the prudential consideration that “disruption of the land claims at issue in [the] case
would have negative consequences to the pace of American economic development” Levinson, infra
note 181, at 96. See also George R. Lamplugh, Yazoo Land Fraud, NEW GEORGIA ENCYCLOPEDIA
(Sept. 12, 2002), https://www.georgiaencyclopedia.org/articles/history-archaeology/yazoo-landfraud.
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associated with American revolutionary ideals. These rationalizations
profoundly influenced the development of international law in the Americas and
its diminishment of place-based sensibility.
A. THE SUPPRESSION OF THE INTERNATIONAL SLAVE TRADE
The US outlawed the international slave trade on January 1, 1808,156 ending
a practice that was lawful in this part of the New World for nearly 200 years and
marking “the first time in history that a slaveholding society voluntarily ceased
to import new slaves.”157 Legal historian Paul Finkelman described this
termination of the African trade as “the most successful antislavery action of the
founding generation at the national level,” and yet it contrasted sharply with the
institution itself, which remained legal in the US and elsewhere in the New
World, and “with the proslavery legislation providing for the return of fugitive
slaves” and the failure to end slavery in the Northwest Territory following
adoption of the Northwest Ordinance in 1787.158 It also contrasted with the
imagery of Thomas Jefferson’s ‘Empire of Liberty’,159 set against Jefferson’s
personal and lifelong desire to avoid the problem of slavery in light of his
“profound negrophobia.”160 And it personally bedeviled slaveholding defenders
of American republican virtue, as reflected in a litany of slave cases that reached
the Marshall and Taney Supreme Courts between 1801 to 1864, “not one
decided in support of a freedom suit.”161 Even the revered Justice Joseph
Story,162 who never owned a slave (Marshall, however, owned hundreds during
his life163), and at times professed open hostility toward the institution, wrote the
opinion in Prigg v. Pennsylvania (1842),164 that “made every black in the North,
even if born free, vulnerable to being seized as a fugitive slave without any dueprocess hearing.”165 Finkelman claimed that this decision “was as proslavery as
anything Chief Justice Taney would conjure up in the Dred Scott case [1857],”
which held that all people of African descent, free or slave, were not US citizens
and that slaves were the legal property of their owner.166 A formalistic obedience
to the Constitution, which embedded pro-slavery provisions such as the three156 Act Prohibiting Importation of Slaves, 2 Stat. 426 (1807), Pub. L. 9-22 (effective Jan. 1, 1808).
157 PAUL FINKELMAN, SLAVERY AND THE FOUNDERS: RACE AND LIBERTY IN THE AGE OF JEFFERSON
133 (3d ed. 2014).
158 Id.
159 The phrase appears in several of Jefferson’s correspondences. See From Thomas Jefferson to George
Rogers
Clark,
25
December
1780,
Founders
Online,
NATIONAL
ARCHIVES,
https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/01-04-02-0295; Thomas Jefferson to James
Madison,
27
April
1809,
Founders
Online,
NATIONAL
ARCHIVES,
https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/03-01-02-0140.
160 PAUL FINKELMAN, SLAVERY AND THE FOUNDERS 198 (1996).
161 PAUL FINKELMAN, SUPREME INJUSTICE: SLAVERY IN THE NATION’S HIGHEST COURT 220 (2018).
162 Bernard Schwartz, Supreme Court Superstars: The Ten Greatest Justices, 31 TULSA L.J. 93, 99
(1995) (associating Story’s constitutional legacy with that of his contemporary on the bench, John
Marshall); M.H. Hoeflich, John Austin and Joseph Story: Two Nineteenth Century Perspectives on the
Utility of the Civil Law for the Common Lawyer, 29 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 36, 56 (1985) (comparing
Story to John Austin as one of the “most substantial legal intellects of the first half of the nineteenth
century”).
163 FINKELMAN, supra note 161, at 27, 31.
164 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539 (1842). The case held that the Fugitive Slave Act precluded a state law that
prohibited the return of blacks from the free state of Pennsylvania to a slave state.
165 FINKELMAN, supra note 161, at 7.
166 Id. at 4. See generally Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
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fifths clause,167 the Electoral College,168 the slave-trade clause,169 the fugitive
slave clause,170 the South’s veto power over amending these provisions,171
helped to account for Story’s problematic treatment of this subject, and
eventually his silence on Marshall’s bench on bondage cases argued before the
Supreme Court.
In 1819, Congress granted the President the authority to return captives
illegally brought to the US to Africa,172 in part due to the Abolitionist movement
and in part due to the American Colonization Society’s campaign to return
illegally imported Africans to places such as Liberia.173 A latent tension
separated the interests of these two movements, as the intentions of the
American Colonization Society also could be construed as an act of removal, not
of the institution of slavery itself, but rather of free blacks back to Africa. Francis
Scott Key, who penned the poem that would become the lyrics to the nation’s
national anthem (The Star-Spangled Banner),174 helped to establish the society
and supported this solution, which ultimately returned about 13,000 Africans to
Africa’s West Coast. Though Key’s poem memorialized the “land of the free,””
he owned slaves and conceived of removing free African descendants as the only
pragmatic (half) solution to an intractable problem.175
Furthermore, interpretation of the Slave Trade Act produced questions and
substantially different conclusions regarding interdiction of foreign slave
vessels. A number of these cases reached the Supreme Court, mostly on
167 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3 (providing that Congressional representation be based on “the whole
Number of Free Persons” and “three fifths of all other Persons [slaves].” The clause increased the
population of southern states, notwithstanding the fact that slaves were otherwise treated as property
only, bolstered southern representation in Congress and the Electoral College, affected direct tax
obligations among states, and enticed southern states, principally South Carolina and Georgia, to ratify
the document. See Keith Dougherty, Slavery in the Constitution: Why the Lower South Occasionally
Succeeded at the Constitutional Convention, 73 POL. RES. Q. 638 (2019).
168 See FINKELMAN, supra note 161, at 15 (noting “[t]he creation of the Electoral College was also
directly tied to slavery,” largely by the efforts of James Madison, who worked to tether the number of
electors equal to a state’s total congressional representation, which in part depended on the three-fifths
clause).
169 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 1 (prohibiting the federal government from limiting the “Migration or
Importation of such Persons as any of the States now existing shall think proper to admit . . . until
[1808]”).
170 U.S. Const. art. IV, § 2, cl. 3 (recognizing that a “Person held to Service or Labour” escaping into
another state be returned.
171 U.S. Const. art. V (requiring a three-fourths majority of states to ratify amendments to the
Constitution).
172 1819 Slave Trade Act (The Act in Addition), ch.101, 3 State. 532 (1819).
173 See Eric Burin, The Slave Trade Act of 1819: A New Look at Colonization and the Politics of Slavery,
13 AM NINETEENTH C. HIST. 1, 2 (2012) (discussing the 1819 Act and the campaign to obtain federal
assistance under the guise of helping to dispose of “recaptured Africans”).The Act was influenced by
the Society for the Colonization of Free People of Color of America, which formed to promote the
migration of free Blacks to Africa. For its history and important American historical figures associated
with the movement, see EARLY LEE FOX, THE AMERICAN COLONIZATION SOCIETY 1817-1840 (1917).
174 The song, although popular since set to John Stafford Smith’s music, did not become the national
anthem of the U.S. until 1931. See 36 U.S.C. § 301.
175 See generally MARC LEEPSON, WHAT SO PROUDLY WE HAILED: FRANCIS SCOTT KEY, A LIFE (2014)
(noting Key’s complicated profile with regard to slavery and race and tensions between the
Abolitionists and the American Colonization Society); The African American Mosaic: Colonization,
LIB. CONG., https://www.loc.gov/exhibits/african/afam002.html (last visited Dec. 19, 2020) (noting
about 13,000 returnees by 1867); Francis Scott Key, The Defence of Fort McHenry [The Star Spangled
Banner], third verse (noting the “foul footsteps” of the slaves who ran toward the British siege of Fort
McHenry seeking freedom: “[n]o refuge could save the hireling and slave, [f]rom the terror of flight
or the gloom of the grave”).
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technical issues of when a voyage began or questions of proof necessary to
convict the trader.176 The irony of the Supreme Court’s slave-holding justices
presiding over the disposition of such human cargo also did not go unnoticed,177
but could be reconciled, at least in part, in terms sanctioning the appeal of
formalism, which justified material agrarian interests associated with land
management.
Interesting juxtapositions in terms of juridical treatment arose, however,
particularly involving the interdiction of human cargo at sea. In the case of the
United States v. Schooner Amistad of 1841, the Supreme Court recognized that
native-born Africans afloat a Spanish vessel found in U.S. waters off the coast
of Long Island, New York, had been kidnapped and enslaved in violation of the
laws of Spain.178 The Africans had taken control of the ship and had killed its
captain and cook. The mutineers were set free, in large part due to the advocacy
of former President John Quincy Adams before the Supreme Court. Adams’
eight-and-one-half hour argument referenced, but eschewed, an appeal to
external natural law, noting no other applicable law, statute, constitution, code,
or treaty “applicable to the proceedings except that law” deriving from within
the ethos of America’s Declaration of Independence.179 Similarly, in the United
States v. La Jeune Eugenie of 1822, Justice Story, riding circuit in
Massachusetts, upheld as valid the search and seizure of a French slave vessel
disguised as a trader in palm oil.180 He wrote that the slave trade aggregated
“accumulated wrongs” that could hardly be consistent with the law of nations.181
Story assessed the foreign slave trade’s legal status in federal courts according
to a unitary connection between domestic and international law, presenting a
rationally deducible natural law outcome that nevertheless implicitly recognized
the sensitive political nature of the judgment when he allowed the slave vessel
to be returned to the French rather than condemned and sold to support
prohibition of the practice. In The Antelope of 1825,182 however, Chief Justice
Marshall foreshadowed a more materialist construction of formalism and its rise
by drawing a “sharp contrast between the jurist and the moralist.”183 Story
silently concurred in what Finkelman described as Marshall’s “dressing down
[of] his closest colleague on the Court for arguing [in La Jeune Eugenie] that the
trade violated” natural law and the law of nations.184

176 Paul Finkelman, Slavery in the United States: Persons or Property?, in THE LEGAL UNDERSTANDING
OF SLAVERY: FROM THE HISTORICAL TO THE CONTEMPORARY 105, 122 (Jean J. Allain ed., 2012); See
generally FINKELMAN supra note 161. In total, the Marshall Court heard more than 50 cases involving
slavery. FINKELMAN, supra note 161, at 27.
177 Proctors hired by Abolitionists to represent the interests of the Africans aboard the Amistad, as against
the libel and admiralty claim of salvage rights for the ship and human cargo, argued: “each of them are
natives of Africa and were born free, and ever since have been and still of right are and ought to be
free, and not slaves.” Proctors' Answer, Gedney v. Schooner Amistad (Jan. 24, 1840),
https://www.docsteach.org/documents/document/answer-proctors-amistad-africans (last visited Dec.
19, 2020).
178 United States v. Schooner Amistad, 40 U.S. 518 (1841).
179 Argument of John Quincy Adams at 8, United States v. Schooner Amistad, 40 U.S. 518 (1841)
https://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/amistad_002.asp (last visited Dec.19, 2020).
180 26 F. Cas. 832 (C.C. D. Mass. 1822) (No. 15,551).
181 Id. at 846.
182 The Antelope, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 66 (1825).
183 Sanford Levinson, Slavery in the Canon of Constitutional Law – Symposium on the Law of Slavery:
Constitutional Law and Slavery, 68 CHI-KENT L. REV. 1087, 1096 (1997) (emphasis added).
184 FINKELMAN, supra note 161, at 129.
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The Antelope had set sail under American flag from Baltimore in 1819,
however it switched flags at sea after it was captured by pirates. It then
proceeded to plunder ships off the coast of West Africa, accruing slaves along
the way. It later commingled and consolidated human cargo claimed by Spain
and Portugal, was intercepted by a U.S. revenue cutter, and taken to the port of
Savannah, where a three-way dispute arose among Portugal, Spain, and the U.S.
over the custody of the Africans. Chief Justice Marshall noted how “abhorrent”
the slave trade was, even opining “[t]hat it is contrary to the law of nature . . . .
[because] every man has a natural right to the fruits of his own labor.”185 Yet he
recognized “it has been sanctioned . . . by the laws of nations . . . [as a] common
commercial business . . . . from long usage, and general acquiescence . . . ,”186
and also as a right of conquest established by the customs and usages of war.187
Although he denounced slavery and the international slave trade “as violative of
natural rights, natural law, and Christian morality,”188 he cautioned that the
“Court must not yield to feelings which might seduce it from the path of duty,
and must obey the mandate of the law.”189 Marshall wrote: “Whatever might be
the answer of a moralist to this question [regarding the legality of the slave
trade], a jurist must search for its legal solution . . . [and make] resort to this
standard as the test of international law.”190 Marshall treated the 258 Africans
aboard the ship as commercial property, and a rough, pro-rated formula
eventually divided the lot of Africans. The Court determined that the captives
claimed by non-U.S. nations were slaves. Africans placed in the custody of the
U.S. were returned to Africa; others sold to American slave owners with
proceeds remitted to the Spanish and Portuguese to cover their losses.191
Importantly, Story’s approach in La Jeune Eugenie seemed to keep one eye
squarely on the nation’s relations with an important ally, France, whereas
Marshall’s approach in The Antelope ascertained the appropriate legal principle
with one eye squarely on not upsetting Southern slave-holding sensibilities. A
formative movement toward a formalistic, place-based rulemaking was in the
making or at play in both cases, neither one of which respected human
geography.

185 The Antelope, supra note 182, at 120.
186 Id. at 115. No nineteenth century justice more personally exemplified the turmoil of slavery than
Justice Joseph Story, as he sided with the majority in The Antelope notwithstanding his opinion to the
contrary in La Jeune Eugene. For an interesting and personal account of his legal struggle with the
issues of slavery and the slave trade, see Paul Finkelman, Joseph Story and the Problem of Slavery: A
New Englander’s Nationalist Dilemma, 8 MASS. L. HIST. 65, 69–76 (2002).
187 The Antelope, supra note 182, at 120 (opining from time-tested usages “in which all have acquiesced
. . . that the victor might enslave the vanquished.”).
188 Levinson, supra note 183, at 1096.
189 The Antelope, supra note 182, at 114.
190 Id. at 121.
191 Four of the then six justices who sat on the Supreme Court, including Marshall, owned slaves, and
the commingled composition of proprietary interests aboard the ship and sensitivities of American
slave holders may have factored into the derivation of the pro-rated formula used to divvy up the
chattel. See JONATHAN M. BRYANT, DARK PLACES OF THE EARTH: THE VOYAGE OF THE SLAVE SHIP
ANTELOPE (2015).
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B. INDIAN REMOVAL
The campaign against Natives, stimulated in part by the 1829 discovery of
gold in Cherokee country (Georgia),192 resulted in the Indian Removal Act
(1830), which displaced Natives of the five autonomous Gulf and southern
republics—the Choctaw, Chickasaw, Creek, Cherokee, and the last to resist, the
Seminole—to land west of the Mississippi River.193 During this period,
according to historian Angie Debo, the “age of military conquest was succeeded
by the age of economic absorption, when the long rifle of the frontiersman was
displaced by the legislative enactment and court decree of the legal exploiter,
and the lease, mortgage, and deed of the land shark.”194
Indian removal provided another portal through which formalism would
enter into hemispheric international law. Although the process would congeal
toward the end of the nineteenth century, the removal campaign between 1814–
1858 spread Trails of Tears across the closing of the American frontier while
massively redistributing Native homelands.195 In one fourteen-year period
beginning in 1850, “nearly the entire west coast of the United States transferred
from Indian to American hands.”196
A shading of this formalism appeared in the seventeenth century when
England’s Charles II rescinded in 1680 his Carolinas land grant of 1629 and
converted it into in a proprietary land charter to stimulate migratory land
speculators and generate profit.197 The King’s Bench already had established the
common law principle of jus soli in Calvin’s Case of 1608, which laid the ground
for assigning title to land based on birthright citizenship, which then extended
property rights to the postnati.198 Robert Williams claimed this case established
the presumption of English superior rights over the Natives’ America.199 It set
off a long string of metropolitan engagements and conflicting possessory
entitlements based on discovery and conquest that increasingly involved and
diminished aboriginal space. Part of this reasoning rested on the diminished

192 See DAVID WILLIAMS, THE GEORGIA GOLD RUSH: TWENTY-NINERS, CHEROKEES, AND GOLD FEVER
(1993) (detailing the first gold rush in U.S. history).
193 See Indian Removal Act, Pub. L. No. 21-148, 4 Stat. 411 (1830). An Act to provide for an exchange
of lands with the Indians residing in any of the states or territories, and for their removal west of the
river Mississippi. Much has been written about the removal of these five tribes, which became known
as the Five Civilized Tribes, given their intentional adaptation to European political and governance
structures and dress. See also ANTON TREUER, ATLAS OF INDIAN NATIONS (2013). However, other
nations of this region were also affected, including the Biloxi, Catawba, Chitimacha, Coushatta,
Miccosukee, and Tunica. Id. at 84–87.
194 See generally DEBO, supra note 80, ix. On Native land cessions and removal resistance, leading to
the protracted war between the United States and the Seminole in the swamps of Florida (1835-1842),
see CARL WALDMAN, ATLAS OF THE NORTH AMERICAN INDIAN 223–24 (3d ed., 2009).
195 The expression “Trail of Tears” specifically attaches to the forcible removal to the west of 15,000
Cherokees during the Fall and Winter of 1838 and 1839. Four thousand Cherokees died during the
forced march, which opened up 4,366,554 acres of land for white settlement. For a detailed map of the
territory taken, surveyed for the state by John Bethune in 1831, see “A map of that part of Georgia
occupied by the Cherokee Indians . . .”, Geography and Map Division, LIB. CONG.
https://www.loc.gov/resource/g3920.ct006918/ (last visited Dec. 19, 2020).
196 TREUER, supra note 193, at 18.
197 See MILLER, supra note 88, at 21.
198 (1608) 77 Eng. Rep. 389 (K.B.) (ruling by Lord Chief Justice Edward Coke that a Scotsman could
claim testamentary bequests to land in England, although alien born, due to his bloodline).
199 ROBERT A. WILLIAMS JR., THE AMERICAN INDIAN IN WESTERN LEGAL THOUGHT: THE DISCOURSES
OF CONQUEST 204 (1990).
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capacity of Natives (perpetui inimici) to engage in relations with Christians, and
part of the reasoning asserted that Natives occupied domain as tenants at will,
never having settled, encumbered, cleared, or improved their land.200
There is double irony here. Native peoples of North America, bearers of the
originary claim of jus soli, were subjected to its imperfect application by the
European imaginary, even after the Cherokee “were one of the first tribal groups
to acquire U.S. citizenship.”201 Moreover, many Native peoples, particularly the
Eastern Cherokee, converted toward agrarianism during the Monroe presidency.
The Cherokee accepted missionary schools; developed their own alphabet in
1821, a remarkable syllabary designed by Sequoyah;202 openly adapted
European conventions and dress; converted matrilineal clan-based decisionmaking into representative councils and constitutional government; established
newspapers, a diplomatic corps, and even developed forced labor plantations.203
These efforts earned them a measure of acceptance as a Civilized Tribe until
material interests in frontier land accumulation and expansion necessitated the
application of the jus soli principle to bring about their removal.
In 1831, the state of Georgia pressed its claim of superior rights when its
land surveyors entered Cherokee territory. The Cherokee then brought suit
before the Supreme Court, where Chief Justice Marshall denied them relief
because the suit was improperly brought as that of a foreign nation, when, at
best, the Natives’ status was that of “a domestic, dependent nation . . . in a state
of pupilage.” 204 The Treaty of Paris (1763) had ended the French and Indian
War, settling metropolitan territorial disputes in favor of British rule over the
northern Ohio Valley, territory east of the Mississippi River, and Spanish
Florida. It did not, however, settle the question of expanding colonial interests
over the southeastern territory, fomented by the mythos of American
expansionism. According to historian Grandin, “[t]here was not one problem
caused by expansion that couldn’t be solved by more expansion.”205 The idea of
perfecting territorial acquisition through legal ritualism took shape. From 1774
until about 1832, treaties became the method for establishing land holdings,
entitlements, and borders between individual sovereign American Nations and
the U.S. government.206 Between 1778 and 1833, special Indian commissioners

200 Calvin’s Case, supra note 198, at 397; See Edward Cavanagh, Infidels in English Legal Thought:
Conquest, Commerce and Slavery in Common Law from Coke to Mansfield, 1603-1793, 16 MOD. INT.
HIST. 375 (2019).
201 TREUER, supra note 193, at 84 (according to a treaty provision of 1817, more than 100 years before
the Indian Citizenship Act of 1924).
202 MILLER, supra note 88, at 172.
203 See TREUER, supra note 193, 76–85.
204 Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 10 (1831).
205 GRANDIN, supra note 84, at 270.
206 See American Indian Treaties, Native American Heritage, NATIONAL ARCHIVES,
https://www.archives.gov/research/native-americans/treaties. After 1832, until 1871, Native Nations
were considered to be domestic, dependent tribes and negotiated treaties between tribes and the U.S.
had to be approved by Congress. After 1871, the House of Representatives “ceased recognition of
individual tribes within the U.S. as independent nations . . . , ending the nearly 100-year-old practice
of treaty-making between the U.S. and Native tribes. Id.
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acting for the President under the supervision of the Secretary of War negotiated
and concluded 374 treaties with indigenous peoples.207
However, underpinning this burgeoning reference to parchment was the
immanent construct of interpretation provided by new rules associated with
conquest and land conversion. In 1823, Chief Justice Marshall imparted legal
significance to the discovery doctrine in the landmark Supreme Court case,
Johnson v. M’Intosh.208 Marshall ruled that the Piankeshaw and Illinois Natives
had no capacity to sell their land to private Eastern land speculators in part
because they never owned it. They were “fierce savages . . . whose subsistence
was drawn chiefly from the forest,” and because, in Lockean terms, they did not
“improve the land” but “[left] the country a wilderness.”209 Marshall rationalized
that Natives “could not be governed as a distinct society.”210 Land appropriation
“in the immediate neighbourhood of agriculturalists became unfit for them. . . .
[Settlers] parcelled out and [took] possession of [the soil]; and the Natives fled,
chasing game.211 Marshall reasoned that the law regulating conquest applied to
a static, not ambulatory, almost nomadic notion of what it meant to be
conquered. That nomadic construction “was incapable of application.”212 He
held the “unavoidable” need to “resort to some new and different rule, better
adapted to the actual state of things.”213 The Court ruled that Natives had no fee
title to convey as they essentially only secured an “occupancy” interest in their
land and thus held no real property interest to convey. Marshall reasoned that
they lost the right of alienability as a legal consequence of discovery by
colonizing European sovereigns. This right subsequently passed by conquest or
purchase from the English Crown to the rightful holders of American land
titles.214 Marshall’s formalistic reasoning asserted the fundamental rule
deducible from conquest and the Law of Nations: “However extravagant the
pretension of converting the discovery of an inhabited country into conquest
may appear, if the principle had been asserted in the first instance, and afterwards
sustained; if a country has been acquired and held under it; if the property of the
great mass of the community originates in it, it becomes the law of the land, and
cannot be questioned.”215
The rationale for the dependency doctrine had been laid out in an 1822
Indian Commission report by Jedidiah Morse to the Madison Administration.216
The European settlers’ right to appropriate aboriginal land was based on the

207 Ratified Indian Treaties 1722-1869, NATIONAL ARCHIVES MICROFILM PUBLICATIONS (1973),
https://www.archives.gov/files/research/microfilm/m668.pdf. The National Archives maintains a
chronological list of 374 treaties signed between British, then US negotiators and Native Tribes
(including “a few entries dated as late as 1883”).
208 Johnson & Graham’s Lessee v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. 543 (1823).
209 Id. at 590.
210 Id.
211 Id. at 590, 591.
212 Id. at 591.
213 Id.
214 See id. at 587 (reasoning that “discovery gave an exclusive right to extinguish the Indian title of
occupancy, either by purchase or by conquest.”).
215 Id. at 591.
216 JEDIDIAH MORSE, A REPORT TO THE SECRETARY OF WAR OF THE UNITED STATES ON INDIAN
AFFAIRS, COMPRISING A NARRATIVE OF A TOUR PERFORMED IN THE SUMMER OF 1820 UNDER A
COMMISSION FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, FOR THE PURPOSE OF ASCERTAINING, FOR
THE USE OF THE GOVERNMENT, THE ACTUAL STATE OF THE INDIAN TRIBES IN OUR COUNTRY (1822).
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latter’s “qualified” occupancy of the land that provided “no power to convey”
or own. The report held that “[t]he right of soil, or the absolute property,
belong[ed] to the Sovereign, or State under whose authority the discovery and
settlement were made.”217 The right of soil subsequently passed and “vested in
the states of this Union.”218
The ruling in M’Intosh contrasted with Marshall’s rationale in Worcester v.
Georgia (1832),219 indicating the early ambivalence associated with formalism.
In that case, the Supreme Court ruled that the state of Georgia could not impose
licensing laws on white Christian missionaries residing in Cherokee territory in
Georgia. The state had attempted through this licensing law to stop sympathizers
from associating with the Cherokee Nation, which the Court ruled violated the
Constitutional provision that granted to Congress the authority to regulate
commerce with Natives.220 Citing the Swiss authority on the Law of Nations,
Emmerich de Vattel (1714-1767), Marshall noted that “Tributary and feudatory
states . . . do not thereby cease to be sovereign and independent states” simply
by associating with a stronger power.221 “[T]he Indian nations had always been
considered as distinct, independent political communities, retaining their
original natural rights as the undisputed possessors of the soil.”222 The tensions
and contradictions were apparent early in the nineteenth century. However,
formalism’s pull in support of material interests involving land management,
expansionism, public and private distinctions, and the maturation of an
American legal profession based on private contract, matched with a maturing
international legal consciousness that imparted immanent authority to emerging
liberalism, took hold after the Civil War, spreading its dominant construction of
sovereign interests over the place-based and indigenous concern for human
geography.
IV. CONCLUSION: SPATIAL IMPLICATIONS FOR INDIGENOUS RIGHTS TODAY
Discussion about indigenous peoples as a “global concept” only gained
prominence in the 1970s.223 Even then, scholars debated the substantive
sufficiency of the term. Some scholars deemed it an “unworkable and
dangerously incoherent” normative construct.224 Others resisted the separation
of minority rights from indigenous rights.225 Skepticism abated with the
International Labor Organization’s (ILO) definition in 1989, which connected
tribal peoples to “social, cultural and economic conditions,” as distinguished
from other sectors of the national community, “on account of their descent from
217 Id. at 279.
218 Id.
219 Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
220 Id. at 559.
221 Id. at 520, 561.
222 Id. at 559.
223 See Kingsbury supra note 40, at 414-15.
224 Id. at 415.
225 For a nuanced discussion of the problematic distinctions between minorities and indigenous peoples,
see Dieter Kugelmann, Protection of Minorities and Indigenous People Respecting Cultural Diversity,
in 11 MAX PLANCK YEARBOOK OF UNITED NATIONS LAW 233, 236—239 (Armin von Bogdandy &
Rüdiger Wolfrum eds., 2007) (noting difficulties regarding development of generally accepted
definitions of both terms).
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the populations which inhabited the country, or a geographical region . . . the
time of conquest or colonization or the establishment of present state
boundaries.”226
The ILO definition tethered indigenous peoples to considerations of time,
place, and conquest. A history of subordination has turned indigenous rights into
a world-wide resistance movement—a movement characterized by contested
claims to spatial domain. This resistance movement may currently focus
attention on peoples such as the Dongria Kondh and their struggles against
transglobal capitalism’s encroachment into their sacred mountain domain;
however, historically, it naturally focuses attention on the Americas, where the
first “full impact” of modern European expansion began.227
A fuller consideration of indigenous rights—as something other than a
resistance movement—has yet to occupy a central place in the progressive
development of international law. The argument here is that early American
contradictions between the republican virtues on which independence was
founded conflicted with the institution of slavery and the mythos of frontier
expansion, which facilitated the abrogation of treaties, land grabs, and Indian
removal. Inconsistencies in important case law germinating from the prohibition
of the international slave trade, together with the internalization of the jus soli
principle to establish European birthright to land in the New World, oriented
early American encounters with international law toward a problematic and still
forming sense of immanence. This immanence vacillated between natural law
and natural rights methods of ascertaining applicable principles, with
rationalized European-descendant title accrued by means of conquest, land
domination, and Christianity’s civilizing mission.
The prohibition of the international slave trade accommodated a foreign
policy sensibility that promoted an international presence for the new country,
but not at the expense of upsetting a complicated balance of power among
seafaring nations, which did not include the United States. At the same time, a
confusing if not irreconcilable recognition of regional slave practices in the
South, which was at the core of the southern region’s economy, had to be
accommodated in view of the outlawry of international slave trading, even as
imperfectly practiced along the Atlantic hemispheric seaboard. Internal
rationalizations produced formalistic legal principles that supported spatial
constructs and pro-slavery provisions of the Constitution while imperfectly
chipping away at the international slave trade.
With regard to Indian removal, the juridical mindset of immanence, reliant
on German historicist influences of space and place—concepts also reflected in
Lockean and Kantian (and later Schmittian) notions of land conversion and
improvement—contrasted with presumptions of mere Native tenancy interests
over their spatial domain, a tenancy interest exemplified by their unimproved
stewardship and nomadic, non-agrarian or fenced-in relationship to place. These
presumptions, however untrue, fed into a mythos of civilization and
expansionism that generated the basis for vesting land title in European and
American frontier understandings of sovereignty.

226 ILO Convention No. 169, June 27, 1989, 28 ILM 1382, 1384–85 (1989).
227 EDWARD H. SPICER, CYCLES OF CONQUEST: THE IMPACT OF SPAIN, MEXICO, AND THE UNITED
STATES ON THE INDIANS OF THE SOUTHWEST, 1533-1960, at 1 (1962).
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The struggle over the meaning of legal formalism began much earlier than
its usually fully-formed periodization as a post-Civil War movement. However,
the expression of mature formalism supported the rational ascertainment of
principles that turned common law into an instrument of material development
and dominium. As the common law developed over the long nineteenth century,
the reaffirmations of immanence gained support from the professionalization of
legal practice and pedagogy, which witnessed during the latter part of the
nineteenth century a parallel development of an international legal mindset as a
mature, stand-alone discipline.
Writers of the Golden Age of international law fortified the independent
status of international law and portaged its positivistic formality into the
twentieth century. However, this incorporation also drew from Wheaton’s
admixture of pragmatic American common law, which itself projected a
community ideal consistent with Christian and state-centric influences.
International law’s difficult encounter with human geography helps to
explain the impediments to the fuller expression of human rights and indigenous
rights and why these projects will remain resistance movements until
international law broadens its notion of place and takes more seriously
spatiality’s effect on the construction of international law.

